In the United States, the average age of homicide victims in 2025 is the highest recorded since at least before 1976. That is what the FBI data seems to indicate, according to criminal analyst Jeff Asher.

The best source of data on homicide victims in the U.S. is the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR). The SHR is a collection of data from the FBI on all homicide victims in a given year. Agencies report details about the month, the age of the victim and the offender, race and sex, the circumstances behind the homicide, and what type of weapon was used.

The SHR is somewhat difficult to address. Not all states participate (for example, the state of Florida does not report) and not all agencies report every year. Many computers can today manage a spreadsheet of 20,000 rows and 100 bytes, but the SHR is produced in ASCII format, which is incredibly difficult to use.

Fortunately (and this is an understatement), Jacob Kaplan has studied all the old SHR data dating from 1976 to 2024 and has made it reasonably easy for everyone to access. Typically, between 80% and 90% of the estimated number of homicides each year appear in the SHR, although this figure has been increasing in recent years thanks to Florida starting to report again. The increase in 2024 likely reflects that the estimate for that year needed to be revised upward by several hundred, but more than 90% of last year’s homicides appeared in the SHR.

The analysis of the data for 2025 should be taken with caution because the data are not definitive. Obviously, the year is not over, but even the agencies that have reported have not done so completely. However, it is a major victory that the FBI’s monthly reports include the SHR.

If we go back to the SHR until 1976, we see the trend that the average homicide victim is ageing.

The average homicide victim so far, during this current year, is nearly 36 years old, older than any of the last 50 years of SHR collection. Last year, the average homicide victim was slightly younger, although it is possible that this year’s average age will decrease when the data is fully analysed. Be that as it may, the age of homicide victims in 2024 and 2025 was the highest in more than half a century of data collection.

It is not just a case of the peculiarity of the FBI data. CDC homicide data shows a similar increase in the average age of the homicide victim, which matches almost exactly the FBI’s average age virtually every year since 2001 (higher due to the inclusion of 9/11 in the CDC data).

If we break down the annual homicide victim proportion by age ranges, it shows that just over 60% of homicide victims in the last two years were between 18 and 44 years old, a considerably lower amount than just five years ago.

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Alarmist headlines about crime, drugs and street violence are commonplace in the German media. Viral videos, such as those by South African-born German blogger Kurt Caz showing Frankfurt’s troubled Bahnhofsviertel neighbourhood, reinforce the perception that Germany is experiencing a security crisis. But what does the data really say?

Bahnhofsviertel has historically been a marginal district, with a high presence of drugs and prostitution. Criminologist Susanne Karstedt reminds us that these aspects attract violence and drug-related crime. As in many other countries, German cities have higher crime rates than rural areas, especially in places with marked social inequalities, such as Berlin, Frankfurt or Bremen.

However, Karstedt insists that Germany is a safe country. Crime, in general, has been decreasing since the 80s and 90s of the last century. Technology, as in the case of modern vehicle safety systems, has contributed to this reduction.

Journalists Pere Hille and Kira Schact, from dw.com, consider that one of the most useful indicators to compare safety between countries is the homicide rate. With 0.91 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, Germany ranked 147th in the world in 2024. This figure places it far behind countries such as South Africa (with more than 40 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants) or the United States (5.76).

Two decades ago, Germany had a much higher homicide rate (2.5), showing a clear improvement. However, a recent upturn in violent crime has been detected, especially among young men, a group that is often affected by difficult social conditions.

Discussions on migration and crime often generate controversy. But Karstedt points out that there is no direct relationship between being a migrant and committing crimes. In fact, several studies show that migrants generally commit less crime than native citizens. What does have an influence are social factors such as lack of opportunities, unemployment or educational level.

In addition, many migrants live in urban environments, where crime is statistically higher. Gina Rosa Wollinger, a criminologist from Cologne, stresses that this can distort public perception, since it is not migration per se that explains crime, but the context in which these people live.

Studies on youth crime confirm that the causes of violence are the same for German and non-German youth. But there are more risks among young migrants, especially if they have lived through traumatic experiences of war or social exclusion.

Official crime statistics in Germany come from the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). However, these data only include reported cases.  Domestic violence or sexual assaults often go unreported, especially in rural areas or in close relationships (family members, teachers, coaches, etc.).

Karstedt stresses that most sexual assaults are not committed by strangers, but by someone close to the victim. Cases like New Year’s Eve 2015 in Cologne, in which dozens of women were assaulted by strangers, are the exception, not the norm.

Karstedt, who lives in Australia, but often visits her hometown of Hamburg, says she has always felt safe, even on public transport. Although she acknowledges that Germany may seem less friendly than other countries, she stresses that it is a safe country.

Public perception is often influenced by sensational news stories and viral videos. Despite social challenges and occasional spikes in crime, the data show that Germany remains one of the safest countries in the world.

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The Fundamental Rights Office of Frontex has published the 2024 Annual Report which provides an overview of how rights are protected at the European Union’s external borders and where concerns remain. The report highlights that the Office shapes operations by integrating the protection of rights into all areas of Frontex’s work, including returns, surveillance and cooperation with national authorities.

Geopolitical tensions, war, unrest and natural disasters have been shaping the situation on Europe’s borders. These pressures, which still persist, make the work of the Office even more important.

In 2024, fundamental rights monitors spent nearly 2,000 days on the ground in more than 20 countries. Almost 50 serious incident reports were published and almost 100 complaints were handled. More than 500 field days were dedicated to training and more than 200 return operations were supervised together with national experts.

The report also reflects the growing influence of the Fundamental Rights Office within Frontex. The Office works closely with the agency’s operational command structure, and assists in decision making from the outset. Its long-term strategy aims to ensure that the protection of rights is integrated into all Frontex activities.

The Annual Report covers supervision at EU and non-EU borders, return activities, accountability mechanisms, advisory functions, cooperation and training. It provides specific data on the growing impact of the Office within Frontex and on how member states approach border management.

The report is aimed at both experts and the general public and contributes to the wider debate on how to manage Europe’s borders while respecting European values and legal obligations.

This report is structured in five chapters that reflect this work.

Chapter 1 presents the main findings from the monitoring of activities at the external borders and in other countries.

Chapter 2 covers the monitoring of return operations, the main recommendations on return operations by air and the Frontex reintegration programme.

Chapter 3, on accountability mechanisms and the use of force, describes the main findings of the two main accountability mechanisms under the mandate of the Frontex Fundamental Rights Office: complaint handling and serious incident reporting.

Chapter 4 focuses on the advisory functions of the Office and cooperation. It provides an overview of the advice provided on operational activities and fundamental rights concerns, and of cooperation with third countries and risk analysis. It also presents the agency’s fundamental rights action plan and the technical and operational strategy on integrated European border management, among other policy frameworks relevant to the enforcement of fundamental rights by the European border and coast guard community.

Chapter 5 presents the Office’s commitment in terms of training and skills development, with activities aimed at internal and external stakeholders, often organised in cooperation with external partners.

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Accurate data on firearm injuries in the United States are critical to better understand the total cost or societal burden of gun violence. However, there is no single resource that provides reliable estimates of this type of injury in that country. Data are scarce and, in some cases, too expensive for most researchers.

This lack of information limits the ability of researchers to answer basic questions about gun violence, such as whether injury trends are changing over time or whether harm reduction strategies are effective.

As part of the Gun Policy in America initiative, RAND researchers developed a longitudinal database for the of U.S. national estimates of hospitalisations for non-fatal firearm injuries between 2000 and 2022.

These estimates are based on a variety of data sources, the largest of which are summaries from state inpatient databases (SIDs), which are supplemented by other data from the country’s health department. The estimates do not include emergency department visits that do not result in subsequent hospitalisation or firearm injuries for which inpatient medical care is not sought.

Between 2000 and 2022, there were an estimated 728,617 hospitalisations for non-fatal firearm injuries nationwide: that is an annual average of about 31,600 non-fatal injuries in the United States.

The data also reveal substantial differences in the rate of non-fatal firearm injury hospitalisations among states and relatively stable national trends. These data could help answer questions regarding the effects of state policies and the social cost of firearm injuries to states and the country.

Data and methodology

The model used for non-fatal firearm injury hospitalisations combined SID data that were available through the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP), comprehensive state SID data, data available through U.S. health department web portals on hospitalisation, and data provided by state health departments in response to direct requests from the study team.

Years with data lacking the number of firearm injury hospitalisations were imputed using hypothesised covariates associated with firearm hospitalisations. These covariates included the non-suicide firearm death rate, the rate of firearm deaths in medical facilities, the rate of reported violent crime, and annual demographic, economic, and social characteristics at the national level.

Both the imputation of missing hospitalisation data and the correction for incomplete injury mechanism data were estimated simultaneously in a Bayesian regression model. This model uses a complex error structure that was designed to capture key features of the hospitalisation data, including the greater variance in firearm hospitalisation rates for less populated years and the correlation of values within each state over time. Multiple imputation datasets were created by sampling from the posterior predictive distribution of the model.

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This situation report describes the main developments and trends in the terrorism landscape in the European Union (EU) during 2024. It is based on qualitative and quantitative information provided by member states on terrorist attacks, arrests, convictions and sentences for terrorist offences.

In addition, the cooperation partners of Europol have also provided valuable qualitative information, which has helped to contextualize events outside the EU that may have an impact on the security of the Union and its citizens. Eurojust has provided information on convictions and acquittals for terrorist offences and on amendments to national legislation on terrorism.

EU Member States are obliged to transpose Directive (EU) 2017/541 on combating terrorism into their national legislation. While the main objective of the EU TE-SAT is to present a general overview of terrorism, the report also includes descriptions of specific incidents, acts, activities and events of violent extremism reported by Member States. The quantitative overview of terrorist attacks, arrests, convictions and sanctions does not include cases of violent extremism, but the latter is included in the report for contextualisation purposes and to provide a more complete picture of threats to the security of the Union.

14 member states have reported a total of 58 terrorist attacks (34 completed, 5 failed and 19 foiled). Of the total attacks, 24 were blamed on jihadist terrorism, up from 14 reported the previous year; 21 attacks were attributed to leftist and anarchist terrorism, and 8 attacks were classified as other forms of terrorism or were unspecified. Four separatist attacks and one right-wing terrorist attack were also reported and completed.

Jihadist terrorism remains the most lethal, with five fatalities and 18 injuries.

449 people have been arrested for terrorism-related offences in 20 member states. Most of the arrests were for jihadist terrorism (289), followed by right-wing terrorism (47). 58 arrests were made for terrorist offences related to other or unspecified forms of terrorism in 10 member states.

Judicial proceedings concluded in 16 member states have resulted in 427 convictions and 59 acquittals for terrorist offences.

The conflict in Gaza continues to have a major impact on the terrorist threat in the EU. There have been numerous attacks and calls for violence across the ideological spectrum. Terrorist and violent extremist propaganda online has instrumentalised the conflict and ignited hatred, with anti-Semitism as a common denominator in both cases.

The Russian war against Ukraine has been another driver of the spread of violent extremist narratives, radicalisation and mobilization.

In their search for support and new recruits, terrorist groups target vulnerable people, especially minors and people affected by psychological vulnerabilities.

The number of minors and young people involved in terrorist and violent extremist activities across the EU has continued to grow in 2024. Mental health problems, social isolation and digital dependency have played a major part in the radicalisation of these young people.

The terrorist threat interconnects with a growing variety of online communities that recruit minors and young adults to commit extreme violent acts against themselves and others. Their leaders advocate for the collapse of democratic societies through terror, chaos and violence.

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Researcher Ben Scott, together with Dr. Naomi Pfitzner and Professor Kate Fitz-Gibbon, of Monash University in Australia, have published a thought-provoking study on how police legitimacy is understood in relation to historically marginalised groups. The article, entitled Spatial, Temporal, and Visible:Queer People’s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, proposes a «queering» of traditional theories of police legitimacy: a critical questioning of their basis and applicability beyond cisheteronormative contexts.

The study starts from a clear finding: queer people – gay, lesbian, bisexual, trans and other non-normative identities – have often been relegated to the periphery of criminology, mentioned anecdotally with the usual note of «lack of data». To counter this invisibilisation, the team surveyed nearly 150 queer people in the state of Victoria, Australia, to analyse their perceptions of police legitimacy.

The results, which combine quantitative data and qualitative responses, reveal a number of tensions: most participants recognise the formal authority of the police and express an obligation to obey the laws, but this obedience does not come from a normative or value alignment, but from a sense of social obligation, fear or inertia.

One of the most relevant contributions of the study is the insistence on the contextual nature of police legitimacy. It depends not only on time and space, but also on historical baggage and identity visibility. Those who were most familiar with the history of conflict between the Victoria Police and the queer community – such as raids on nightclubs or media whistleblowing practices – showed a much more deep-seated distrust of the police institution.

Another significant finding refers to the role of queer visibility. Participants’ experiences differ depending on how they are perceived by agents: people who «pass» as cisheterosexual often report fewer negative interactions, while those with more visible gender expressions or sexual orientations report discriminatory or hostile experiences.

Relations between police forces and LGBTIQ+ groups have historically been complex, both in Catalonia and in many other places around the world. These relationships often carry with them a past marked by discrimination, institutional violence and a lack of mutual trust.

Although this study was carried out in Australia, its conclusions are highly relevant to Catalonia. Despite regulatory advances – such as Law 11/2014 to guarantee the rights of LGBTI people and to eradicate homophobia, biphobia and transphobia – there is still a long way to go to ensure a relationship of trust between law enforcement and sexual and gender diversity.

In recent years, efforts have been made to improve this relationship, such as the creation of specialised hate crime units or specific training in diversity within the Mossos d’Esquadra. But these measures must be critically evaluated on an ongoing basis, especially on the basis of the experiences of the people affected.

The Australian study suggests the need to develop alternative avenues of reporting and support beyond the traditional police system, especially for groups that do not trust it. This reflection can inspire initiatives in our country that reinforce community services, specialised care offices or psychological and legal support tools adapted to LGBTIQ+ realities.

Rethinking police legitimacy from a queer perspective is not only a theoretical exercise: it is a tool to build a more inclusive, equal and just security. To this end, it is necessary to listen to the voices that have often been silenced, acknowledge the wounds of the past and commit to a profound transformation of institutions. Only in this way can we move towards a society in which everyone, regardless of gender identity or expression, can feel safe and trusted in the eyes of law enforcement.

Link: Spatial, Temporal, and Visible: Queer People’s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy

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The document is an ENISA report on the state of cybersecurity in the European Union in 2024. Collaboration with the NIS Cooperation Group and the European Commission is highlighted, providing a data-driven overview of cybersecurity at the EU, national and societal levels.

Topics such as the cyber threat landscape, maturity of cybersecurity capabilities, cyber crisis management, supply chain security, and cybersecurity awareness and skills are addressed.

It also includes policy recommendations to improve cybersecurity in the EU, such as strengthening technical and financial support, revising the EU Incident Response Plan, and addressing the cybersecurity skills shortage.

The report includes several policy recommendations to improve cybersecurity in the European Union:

1. Strengthen technical and financial support: It is recommended that further technical and financial support be given to the competent authorities and entities within the scope of the NIS2 Directive to ensure a harmonised and coherent implementation of the EU cybersecurity policy framework.

2. Review the EU Incident Response Plan: It is suggested to review the Incident Response Plan for large-scale cyber incidents, taking into account the latest developments in EU cybersecurity policies, to promote the harmonisation and optimisation of cybersecurity and to strengthen national and EU capabilities.

3. Strengthen the EU’s cyber workforce: Implement the Cybersecurity Skills Academy, establish a common EU approach to cybersecurity training, identify future skills needs and develop a European certification scheme for cybersecurity skills.

4. Address supply chain security: Conduct coordinated risk assessments at the EU level and develop a horizontal policy framework for supply chain security, focusing on both public and private sector cybersecurity challenges.

5. Promote a unified approach: Build on existing policy initiatives and harmonise national efforts to achieve a high common level of cybersecurity and cyber hygiene awareness among professionals and citizens, regardless of their demographics.

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Mass attacks, such as the New Year’s Day incident in New Orleans (USA), stir public emotion and have tragic consequences. While the investigations into this case will take some time, it is known that there are things that law enforcement and society can do to mitigate and perhaps stop mass casualty events.

This is the view of Richard H. Donohue and John S. Hollywood who published research on evidence of protection against attacks, as well as an article in Rand. For example, the car ramming in New Orleans that caused the death of 14 people created fear and uncertainty. While it is impossible to say whether these specific incidents could have been prevented, there are ways to make such attacks more difficult.

First of all, we know that layered security works. To complete a high death toll attack, a would-be terrorist must engage in violence, plan, acquire weapons and skills, complete preparations, arrive on scene, breach the site perimeter and internal security measures, and attack a crowd without being stopped quickly. A system-based, or layered, approach puts the odds in favour of law enforcement, since the attacker must be lucky many times to succeed, while defenders would only need to succeed once.

Therefore, security administrators must think systemically about how their sites look and how the layers of security will work collectively. Access and entry control systems, including working external and internal door locks, secured windows and secure entry spaces, such as monitored entry routes and secured vestibules, have helped protect against attackers. On-scene security, as well as aware and engaged bystanders, have also stopped many attacks. In particular, bystanders who take shooters down to the ground have been very effective in ending mass shootings. The «Run, Hide, Fight» or, alternatively, «Avoid, Deny, Defend» strategies have been effective.

Early detection is one of the most important layers of defence. In New Orleans, no specific leads were reported prior to the actual incident. Our research shows that when there is no initial lead, massive attacks are more likely to be completed. However, when there are direct threats, leads, a search or other criminal pursuits, attempts at such attacks are often thwarted, more than 80 percent of the time.

It is important for the public to know the key signs of a possible mass attack plot, especially when someone shows clear and serious intentions to attack and has taken concrete steps to do so. In addition, it is essential that people know where to report suspicious schemes. For policy makers and budget makers, it is crucial to provide training and support to threat assessment teams that follow up on tips. While it is too late to stop the Bourbon Street attack, the attacker released videos describing his initial detailed plans to kill his family, his joining the Islamic State terrorist network and a last will and testament. These are all examples of specific preparations that could have been reported to the authorities prior to the attack.

Other emerging technologies offer various avenues to stop or mitigate damage from attacks, whether they are used to detect and report clear warning signs of plots before they are launched or are integrated to trigger security measures at the first signs that an incident may be coming.

Ultimately, we know that mass attacks will continue. We also know that hardening a target can lead a potential attacker to look for weaknesses and opportunities in another location. However, we are confident that municipalities, law enforcement agencies and the private sector can come together to detect, deter and mitigate threats to the population from terrorism and other targeted violence acts.

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Recidivism refers to the act of re-offending after release from prison, parole, or probation. It is a very important concept in criminal justice, as it serves as a key to evaluate the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs, sentencing policies and correctional institutions.

This was stated in a recently published report by the EUCPN – European Crime Prevention Network – on reducing recidivism.

The term encompasses various forms of re-entry into the criminal justice system, such as being arrested, repeatedly convicted or re-imprisoned for committing new offences or violating terms of supervision.

Recidivism rates are often expressed as percentages over a specified period, usually within two to three years of release. For example, if 50 out of every 100 persons released re-offend in a three-year period, the recidivism rate would be 50%.

In the European Union, this diversity in both the definition of recidivism and in the data and collection methods is the reason for the lack of comparable data on recidivism.

A 2020 systematic review of recidivism rates worldwide shows, for example, that Denmark uses reconviction rates at six months, one and two years, while Estonia and France measure recidivism up to five and six years after release.

The overall result is that EU countries, broadly speaking, have two-year recidivism rates of between 30% and 50%. If we add to these recidivism rates that many perpetrators re-offend not just once, but two or more times, we quickly conclude that most crimes are committed by a relatively small number of repeat offenders.

Research in Sweden, based on data relating to all violent offenders from 1973 to 2004 shows that 63% of all those convicted in this period committed a crime by perpetrators with three or more convictions, a group that constitutes 1% of the total population, and a quarter of all criminal violence.

Understanding and addressing recidivism is crucial not only for public safety, but also for reducing the social and economic costs associated with repeated incarceration.

Reducing recidivism rates helps ease the burden on overcrowded prisons and ensures a more effective use of taxpayer resources.

High recidivism rates are often cited as evidence of the current shortcomings of incarceration practices. Several studies have shown that prison sentences, in and of themselves, are not effective in reducing crime and preventing recidivism, or at least are no more effective than non-custodial alternatives. More importantly, critics argue that punitive approaches, such as (long) prison sentences, do not address underlying problems and may even aggravate criminal tendencies by isolating people and exposing them to criminogenic environments.

Prisonisation refers to the negative effect that prison sentences can have on prisoners’ mental health and behaviour, including criminality. The very conditions of prison life can have a negative impact on inmates’ mental health. It is also likely that inmates will lose their social support networks at the same time as there are new links with offenders likely to be forged. Post-release opportunities, especially employment opportunities, are reduced by the mere fact of incarceration.

However, not all recidivism can be explained as a consequence of prisonisation. Recidivism is influenced by a number of factors, both individual and systemic. At the individual level, factors such as substance abuse, lack of education, mental health problems and limited employment opportunities increase the likelihood of recidivism.

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A few days ago, the 2024 annual cybersecurity threat report was released by Recorded Future, of the Insikt Group. The report analyses the tactics, techniques and procedures of threat actors and their motivations as of 2024 with the aim of informing with data on cyber risk management and giving tools for threat detection.

It generally argues that the cybersecurity landscape in 2024 was shaped by the resilience of criminal networks and the increasing complexity of enterprise attack surfaces due to the growing use of SaaS products, which in numerous cases led to unauthorised access to corporate and institutional data due to the increase in stolen credentials.

It also states that actions to curb ransomware operations had limited impact as criminals adapted to them. In addition, the report exemplifies how several state-sponsored actors used generative AI for information operations and state of opinion creation, especially during elections in more than 70 countries, to facilitate geopolitical objectives.

Predictions for 2025 include developers using AI to achieve more secure codes, the possibility of fraud in the cryptocurrency world that could lead to market destabilisation, and new threats as a result of the implementation of Generative Artificial Intelligence.

Main conclusions

The growing adoption of SaaS (Software as a Service) amplifies the risk of identity exploits, with stolen credentials accessed by malware to steal information that causes significant damage. These data-stealing infections, often targeting personal devices, gained more credentials per infection than in previous years, increasing the risk to SaaS ecosystems.

Extortion groups proliferate despite police action. Law enforcement actions disrupted major criminal ransomware groups, but the criminals reorganised into smaller groups, demonstrating their operational resilience.

Manufacturing, healthcare and construction were the industries most targeted by ransomware groups,reflecting specific targeting patterns by strategic sectors.

Criminal groups associated with Iran, China and Russia targeted critical civilian infrastructure in disruptive cyberattacks, takinga further step in the hybrid conflicts that increasingly dominate the new contemporary wars.

Generative AI accelerates the spread of inauthentic content in a historic election year. Maliciously influenced state-sponsored operations increasingly rely on GenAI to produce and distribute misleading content to influence elections around the world.

Disruptive tactics and techniques make detection difficult. Criminal groups are increasingly using remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools to evade detection, driven by their operational efficiency. Tactics involving defence evasion showed the greatest increase, highlighting a trend toward strategies that do not involve writing code to disk.

Predictions for 2025

A major breach of AI spoofing in SaaS applications is expected, and new Chinese APT intrusions into U.S. critical infrastructure will be revealed. 

A high-impact cyber incident will likely involve macOS or mobile malware, and crypto fraud will result in a market-destabilising event.

Developers will adopt AI to transition to new code, and the U.S. will move towards harmonisation of cyber regulation.

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