The Home Office, through its MP Sarah Jones, has announced a new strategy to combat the high incidence of knife crime in England and Wales, based on a key idea: most of these crimes are concentrated in very specific areas and occur repeatedly on the same streets and at the same times. This reality has led the UK government to adopt a much more precise, intensive, and data-driven approach to reducing this type of violence.

The plan introduces a new mapping technology capable of identifying areas with a high incidence of crime with an accuracy of up to 0.1 square kilometres. This approach, known as microgeography, allows law enforcement agencies to accurately detect not only where crimes occur, but also when they take place most frequently.

Based on this information, the police will be able to deploy resources in a much more efficient manner, focusing on those areas where the risk is higher. The objective is to move away from generalist strategies and focus on specific and targeted interventions.

The areas identified as hot spots will experience a notable increase in police activity. Among the proposed measures are:

• Increase in police patrols
• Installation of new video surveillance cameras (CCTV)
• Use of live facial recognition
• Implementation of knife detection arches

This set of actions aims to deter the commission of crimes, facilitate the identification of perpetrators, and improve the immediate response capacity to incidents.

The UK Government has allocated over £26 million to the Knife Crime Concentrations Fund. This funding will be distributed among 27 police forces that account for approximately 90% of knife crimes in the country.

This investment is part of a broader plan that aims to halve crime with these weapons within a decade. According to the Crime and Policing Minister, Sarah Jones, this strategy will save lives and strengthen the security of communities.

Beyond the increase in police pressure, the plan also includes measures aimed at prevention. The government recognises that knife crime is often related to social and economic factors, especially among young people.

Therefore, it is planned to:

• Create 50 youth centres («Young Futures Hubs») in affected areas
• Implement panels to detect young people in at-risk situations at an early stage
• Support programmes for schools in vulnerable areas
• Invest in violence reduction programmes and community intervention.

This approach seeks to act before a crime occurs, offering alternatives and support to the most vulnerable groups.

The strategy presents several advantages. Firstly, it allows for the optimisation of police resources, placing them where they are most needed. Secondly, it can generate faster results in reducing crime in specific areas.

However, it also poses some significant challenges. The use of live facial recognition may raise concerns regarding privacy and civil rights. Moreover, the concentration of police activity in certain neighbourhoods could lead to perceptions of excessive police presence.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of the model will largely depend on the quality of the data and the coordination among the different stakeholders involved.

The new strategy of the United Kingdom represents a significant shift in the way knife crime is addressed. By opting for technology, data analysis, and targeted intervention, the government seeks to act with greater precision and effectiveness.

At the same time, the combination of police measures and social prevention initiatives reflects a more comprehensive approach to the problem. While the results are yet to be seen, this strategy could pave the way for other countries facing similar challenges in urban security.

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The article by Katharina Ciax and Simon Runkel analyses how security and counter-terrorism policies transform not only the physical configuration of urban spaces but also their emotional and perceptual dimensions. The case study is Breitscheidplatz square in Berlin, the scene of the vehicle attack during the Christmas market in 2016.

The authors start from a key idea: security is not only implemented with infrastructure and police presence, but also produces an affective atmosphere that modifies the way people experience public space. This connects with the field of everyday urban geopolitics, which studies how the grand discourses on global security take shape in specific spaces such as streets and squares.

Before the attack, Breitscheidplatz was a space characterised by a constant flow of people, surrounded by commercial axes and close to the Bahnhof Zoostation. Although control and surveillance practices had existed since the 1990s – especially linked to the criminalisation of certain groups – the 2016 attack marked a turning point.

After the attack, the square underwent a profound transformation with the installation of Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) measures: concrete blocks, bollards, reinforced street furniture, and a more visible police presence, including a permanent mobile police station. This set of measures transformed the square into a space equipped with a high level of safety, practically unique in Berlin in its level of fortification.

The authors argue that this accumulation of measures not only responds to a functional need for protection but also generates an oversaturation of excessive security that alters the very essence of public space.

One of the central concepts of the article is that of affective atmosphere. Security is not perceived solely through rules or material devices, but through sensations: hostility, constant surveillance, tension, or exclusion. Crossing multiple physical barriers before reaching the square can create a sense of latent threat even though the aim is precisely to reduce risk.

Through sensory ethnographies and participant observation (between 2021 and 2022), the researchers collected testimonies and impressions from users, traders, and neighbours. What emerges is a paradox: the measures aimed at increasing security can create an atmosphere that reinforces the perception of danger.

This transformation particularly affects racialised or marginalised groups. According to the authors, excessive security is not neutral: it reinforces pre-existing discriminatory practices and restricts the actual accessibility of public space. The square ceases to be an open space where people are free to move around and becomes a space of selective control.

The article places this case within a broader framework: the excessive security of European cities following waves of terrorist attacks. This process has driven the militarisation of urban space, the normalisation of defensive infrastructures, and the symbolic construction of internal threats.

In Breitscheidplatz, the combination of luxury consumption, intensive care, and defensive architecture contributes to redefining the identity of the space. The square is not only a place of remembrance of the attack, but also a permanent stage for proactive prevention.

This dynamic shows how global geopolitics (terrorism, European security, discourses on the threat) translates into very concrete decisions regarding urban design, furniture, and police presence. Public space thus becomes a laboratory for the governance of fear.

The main contribution of the article is to demonstrate that security policies have an inseparable material, social, and emotional dimension. Excessive security not only reorganises space but also transforms the way people live and feel.

For the field of urban security, this involves various reflections:

• Physical protection measures generate symbolic and psychological impacts.
• A lot of security can reinforce the perception of risk.
• Security can become a mechanism of social exclusion.
• Public space can lose its function of openness and coexistence if it becomes permanent defence infrastructure.

Ultimately, the Breitscheidplatzcase shows how contemporary anti-terrorism not only protects but also redefines the urban experience. Security ceases to be an invisible element and becomes a tangible, material, and atmospheric presence that shapes daily life.

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Every time a large forest fire breaks out, the same question is asked: How is it possible that we have not been able to avoid it? Images of skies tinged with red, mass evacuations, and entire neighbourhoods reduced to ashes have become normalised in the news. In California, Australia, Canada, or the Mediterranean, fire is no longer perceived as an exceptional phenomenon, but rather as a new constant. But to accept it as fate is a mistake. The tools to drastically reduce the impact of large fires exist. What is lacking is coordination.

Forest fires are not just a natural problem. They are the result of a complex combination of factors: climate change, land management, disorderly urban growth, vulnerable infrastructures, and fragmented response systems. Millions of people today live in the urban-forest interface, areas where homes coexist with highly flammable vegetation. When the fire arrives, the human, economic, and environmental costs are enormous, even for those who do not directly lose their home.

Paradoxically, we have never had so much technology to face this challenge. Satellites capable of detecting ignitions within minutes, ground sensors that monitor risk conditions, artificial intelligence models that project the evolution of fire in real time, drones that map hazardous vegetation, and smart electrical grids that can disconnect before a spark causes a catastrophe. All of this already exists.

These technologies cannot—nor should they—eliminate fire completely. Fire is part of many ecosystems and is essential for their regeneration. But they can prevent a localised fire from turning into a large-scale disaster. They can reduce evacuations, save homes, protect critical infrastructures, and, above all, save lives.

The main problem is not technical, but institutional. The fire prevention and response system is deeply fragmented. Local, regional, and state governments, fire brigades with different competencies, forest management agencies, electric companies, insurers, research centres, technology companies, and local communities are involved. Each party has its own budgets, regulations, data systems, and purchasing processes. The result is an ecosystem in which innovating is difficult, and scaling solutions is even more complicated.

Many promising technological initiatives remain in pilot tests. Public agencies often cannot take the risk of purchasing new technology that is not yet fully validated. Innovative companies do not know which door to call. Foundations fund experiments, but not their large-scale implementation. And the communities with fewer resources are the ones that suffer the most from this lack of coordination, becoming even more exposed.

Other areas of public policy demonstrate that this can be done better. In national security, energy, or aviation, the United States has created agencies that act as a bridge between the public sector, research, and the market. These organisations do not invent technology, but rather identify promising solutions, help to test them, establish common standards, and facilitate their rapid delivery to end users.

What is lacking in the field of forest fires is a similar structure: a coordinating entity with a clear mandate to connect innovators, administrations, emergency services, utility companies, and communities. A neutral party that can detect emerging technologies, promote interoperability, help overcome bureaucratic obstacles, and direct investments towards prevention and mitigation, not just towards extinction when the fire is already out of control.

This does not mean replacing essential policies such as forest management, controlled burns, building codes, or urban planning. On the contrary, technology can make all these measures more efficient and fairer. It can provide better data to firefighters, more accurate alerts to the population, and a faster recovery after the disaster.

Some governments have already started to move in that direction. There are states that have created specific offices for fire innovation or centres of excellence for new aerial combat techniques. But without a coordinated vision at the national or supranational level, progress remains uneven and insufficient in the face of the magnitude of the challenge.

Large fires are not inevitable. They are, to a large extent, a reflection of collective decisions and systems that have not evolved at the pace of risk. If we have been able to transform air safety, hurricane prediction, or earthquake preparedness through investment and coordination, we can also do the same with forest fires. The technology is already there. Now political will and the capacity to organise it are needed.

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When we think of drug prevention, it is unlikely that images of zombies walking down the streets come to mind. But in Dover, New Hampshire, U.S., this surprising combination has become a powerful educational tool. And it is just one of the many initiatives of Dover Youth to Youth (Y2Y), a pioneering programme led by youth working to reduce substance use in their community.

How did Dover Youth to Youth come about?

The project started in 1992, driven by the Dover Police Department, with a small group of eleven secondary school students. The objective was clear: to give a voice to young people and make them an active part of the solution to the problems of substance use and abuse.

Today, Y2Y is a vibrant organisation of more than 70 students aged between 11 and 18, distributed across several action teams. Students join for many reasons: interest in activism, personal experiences, or simply out of a desire to create positive change.

Y2Y activities are varied and very dynamic. Weekly, the teams meet to train and develop projects in four areas:

• Education: Presentations in schools, workshops on medication safety, and community talks.
• Community awareness: Creative campaigns and public events.
• Public policy: Young people have contributed to the passage of eight municipal ordinances and three state laws.
• Media: They have created more than 200 radio announcements and educational videos.

Among its most popular projects is The Zombie Project, a campaign that highlights the importance of participating in the DEA’s Drug Take Back Day. Days before the event, young people dress up as zombies to inform the public about the risks of keeping unnecessary medications at home. Their motto is direct and effective: ‘If you think zombies are scary, you better take a look inside your medicine cabinet’.

In 2013, Dover Youth to Youth was recognised as an evidence-based programme in New Hampshire. This distinction allowed them to expand their influence by providing training and resources to youth groups across the United States. One of its most important projects is the One Voice Youth Empowerment Toolkit, a comprehensive set of tools and guides for other communities to replicate its successful model.

The dramatic increase in fentanyl-related deaths has driven Y2Y to create new campaigns tailored to the current reality. In 2024, they launched Dealer is Not a Doctor, focused on the risks of counterfeit pills that mimic real medications but contain fentanyl in potentially lethal doses.

With the support of DEA agents and a large youth mobilisation, the campaign has included demonstrations, distribution of informational materials, and a strong media presence. The message is clear: Do not take any medication that has not been prescribed by a doctor. A ‘dealer’ is not a doctor and does not care for your health.

The main message of Dover Youth to Youth is that young people have the power to transform their community. Whether disguised as zombies, speaking in front of the town hall, or creating multimedia content, these students demonstrate that prevention is more effective when led by the young people themselves.

For any youth group that wants to start a similar project, Y2Y recommends not to reinvent the wheel: there are tools, national campaigns, and resources prepared to be used. What is important is to have passion, commitment, and the desire to create real change.

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Law enforcement across Europe is fighting tirelessly to stop the increasing amount of cocaine crossing the Atlantic from South America.

According to the Maritime Analysis Operations Centre (MAOC), which monitors transatlantic drug trafficking, 100 suspected drug ships were not stopped last year because European authorities did not have sufficient means to intercept them. Europe has the data on drug-laden ships crossing the Atlantic, but still lacks the available interdiction assets, according to MAOC director Sjoerd Top. Up to 600 ships are monitored by the MAOC every day, while record amounts of cocaine are produced in South America.

In the United Kingdom, 117 tonnes of cocaine were consumed last year, according to the UK National Crime Agency. Meanwhile, the number of cocaine-related deaths has increased tenfold since 2011.

The drugs are generally shipped in large container ships to European ports, such as Rotterdam and Antwerp. Security at these ports has been tightened, causing smugglers to seek alternative routes. Many offload bundles of cocaine from a «mother» ship to a smaller «daughter» vessel, with which they are transported to land. Through this method, tonnes of cocaine have been intercepted at sea in multiple seizures of one or two tonnes in the last six months.

But the cartels are relentless and are increasingly targeting Ireland, the only European country with an open border with the UK, as a back door. Ireland has almost 2,000 miles of very vulnerable coastline, many of it ideal for smuggling, with hundreds of isolated entrances.

The country’s defence forces help fight cartels, but Ireland has the lowest defence spending in the EU, only 0.2% of GDP. The Irish Naval Service has eight ships, but normally only two can be carried out at sea, due to a shortage of seamen. Ireland has 132,000 square miles of water under its jurisdiction, 16% of European waters, and only two fully operational vessels. According to former naval commander Eugene Ryan, this makes no sense.

The same applies to air support. The Irish defence forces are supposed to provide the helicopters to help protect the coast, but sometimes they don’t have a single one available that can do the job.

The drug highway crosses the Atlantic and one of the first countries it reaches is Ireland. The Irish government claims to maintain a continuous presence and surveillance within its maritime domain. It stresses that defence funding will increase by 600 million euros in four years, an increase of 55%, and significant initiatives will be implemented, which have also resulted in the stabilisation of the Naval Service force.

Drug trafficking is a growing problem throughout Europe, and those leading the fight against it say that all countries must do much more to stop it.

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Violence by students at the K-12 level (up to age 14) is disturbingly common. Ensuring that schools have effective ways to identify and prevent these incidents is increasingly important. Various disruptive behaviours or communications, including direct threats, may precede acts of violence.

These reflections are derived from research by several authors such as Brian A. Jackson, Pauline Moore, etc. also published in Rand.

While expulsion of all students exhibiting these behaviours may seem prudent, doing so may be counterproductive, limiting the effectiveness of safety efforts. With effective behavioural threat assessment and management (BTAM) systems in place, schools can assess and respond to behaviour of concern to protect the community and respond to the student whose behaviour has caused concern.

To do this, schools need the tools to respond. Tools may include restrictive measures or the involvement of law enforcement in more serious cases, but other options may be more effective. These additional options include different types of mental health intervention, counselling and other kinds of support. Teams with extensive tools available can better customise their interventions, increasing the likelihood of positive outcomes for all involved.

In this report, the authors draw on published literature and extensive interviews with education and public safety professionals to create an inventory of the many intervention options that are valuable to schools in the BTAM management phase. In addition, drawing on varied approaches from the fields of counselling, school discipline and behaviour management, and other professions that must tailor appropriate services to the needs of the youth in their care, the report discusses decision support tools to help management teams implement this critical part of efforts to prevent targeted violence and sustain school communities.

Several intervention options are available for K-12 BTAM efforts

Through the use of supportive counselling and other interventions, BTAM is expanding the options available to school leaders and staff to address problematic behaviour that has the potential to escalate into violence.

To be effective, school BTAM teams need a broad set of tools that include options tailored to:

• the specificities of a student’s problem behaviours,
• the unique community and school environment, and
• the needs and circumstances of the student(s) involved.

Insights from education, public safety, and other fields can be combined to support the matching of effective interventions to student needs.

Recommendations

To better inform intervention planning, intervention tools should be designed to prioritise the collection of data on factors that can be changed because pieces of information in BTAM, which may be a useful part of assessing the danger posed by an individual, may be useless for intervention planning.

The inventory of intervention options developed in this study could provide a starting point for schools to make conscious decisions as they

• review the options available for their teams and
• identify options that they may not have access to but that could become valuable near-term priorities for strengthening their school safety efforts.

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Violence against ambulance personnel is currently a major problem. The vast majority of ambulance personnel report that they have experienced threats of violence, which affects the well-being of workers, who already perform important, stressful and challenging jobs. Until 2020, incidents involving the use of violence were increasing annually, resulting in additional costs for the ambulance service.

The NHS England (the UK’s national health service), the ambulance service and trade unions agreed on the need for action and implemented various initiatives to reduce the number of employees who experience violence as part of the job. These initiatives included the introduction of body-worn cameras.

One of the problems was that although cameras had been gradually introduced around the world to reduce violence – including in police services or public transport – and there was evidence of their effectiveness, there was limited evidence on how best to make them work in ambulances. Therefore, it was decided to conduct a research study in parallel to the introduction of the cameras to assess their impact.

RAND Europe was in charge of this evaluation. Over a three-year period, 2021 to 2024, data were collected and analysed in close collaboration with ambulance workers and managers. On the basis of all this information, a full report was written.

To determine whether body-worn cameras reduce violence against staff, we examine the broader conditions under which they are most likely to be successful and provide recommendations for improving these conditions. Most of all, because body-worn cameras are only a small part of a larger system of policies and practices aimed at reducing violence and aggression.

The application of body-worn cameras in the ambulance sector was transferred to ambulance trusts on the basis that local trusts were best placed to identify local barriers and opportunities and communicate effectively with local staff.

In the research, they concluded that ambulance personnel have mixed opinions about body-worn cameras, basically because they alone are not a panacea for reducing stress in risky situations, but with more positive than negative opinions. Respondents to the study highlighted the need for broader strategies, such as effective communication.

The role of institutional support emerged as a crucial factor in determining the impact of the cameras on staff well-being and their perception of safety. This aligns with the existing literature, which highlights that supportive environments can enhance the benefits of body-worn cameras. In addition, a strong positive correlation was found between a favourable work culture and positive views of body-worn cameras, suggesting that organisational climate plays an important role in shaping perceptions.

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The declaration notes that international law remains fit for purpose in this digital domain and reiterates that States must comply with certain rules and obligations when engaging in activities in cyberspace.

The declaration recognises that malicious behaviour in cyberspace, including ransomware, is increasing in scale, severity, sophistication and impact, and poses a significant challenge and threat to the functioning of European societies, economies and way of life. However, cyberspace is not a lawless domain.

Respect for and adherence to the UN framework for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace remain essential for maintaining international peace, security and stability. The EU and its Member States therefore reaffirm their full commitment to the implementation of the UN Framework for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, adopted by consensus and repeated on several occasions by the UN General Assembly (UNGA), which affirms, inter alia, that international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, international human rights law and international humanitarian law are fully applicable in cyberspace. cyberspace.

The European Union and its Member States will continue to work with international partners to establish a single, permanent, inclusive, regular and action-oriented United Nations mechanism to implement and promote responsible state behaviour in cyberspace: the Programme of Action.

With this declaration, the Union and its Member States demonstrate that it is possible to reach a common agreement on a set of fundamental principles and rules of international law applicable to cyberspace. A better common global understanding of how international law applies to cyberspace contributes to enhanced global cyber resilience and greater transparency and predictability of states’ conduct in cyberspace and accountability.

In this regard, the EU and its Member States continue to support third countries through training and capacity building on the implementation of the United Nations Framework for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, including on how to develop a national, regional or international position on the application of international law to cyberspace.

This is the first time that the European Union and its Member States have adopted a declaration in this regard. The declaration follows the UNGA’s reiterated endorsement of the framework for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, based on the application of international law. The declaration relates to efforts at the United Nations level, namely the UN open-ended working group (OEWG) on the security and use of information and communication technologies in the period 2021-2025, established by UNGA resolution UN A/RES/75/240 in 2021.

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The Council adopted a package of new anti-money laundering rules that should protect EU citizens and its financial system against money laundering and terrorist financing. A new agency based in Frankfurt will oversee the work of the actors involved. This should ensure that fraudsters, organised crime and terrorists have no room to legitimise their income through the financial system.

Under the new package, all rules that apply to the private sector will be transferred to a new, directly applicable regulation, while a directive will deal with the organisation of the competent national authorities in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.

The regulation comprehensively harmonises anti-money laundering rules for the first time across the EU, closing loopholes for fraudsters. It also extends anti-money laundering rules to new obligated entities, such as most of the crypto sector, luxury goods traders and football clubs and agents. The regulation also establishes stricter requirements, regulates beneficial ownership and sets a limit of €10,000 on cash payments, among other things.

The directive should improve the organisation of state anti-money laundering systems by establishing clear rules on how financial intelligence units (FIUs, the national bodies that collect information on suspicious or unusual financial activities in member states) and supervisors work together.

The regulation creates a new European Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA) that will have direct and indirect supervisory powers over high-risk entities in the financial sector.

Given the cross-border nature of financial crime, the new authority should increase efficiency by creating an integrated mechanism with national supervisors to ensure that obligated entities comply with obligations related to the financial sector. AMLA should also have a supporting role with regard to the non-financial sector and should coordinate and support FIUs.

In addition to the powers of control and to ensure compliance, in cases of serious, systematic or repeated non-compliance with directly applicable requirements, the Authority will impose pecuniary sanctions on the selected regulated entities.

The new anti-money laundering directive also prescribes that EU member states make information from centralised bank account records, containing data on who has a bank account and where, available through a single point of access.

Since the AML directive is to provide access to the single point only to FIUs, the Council has adopted a separate directive to ensure that state law enforcement authorities have access to these registers through the single point of access. This directive also includes the harmonisation of the format of bank statements. This direct access and the use of harmonised formats by banks is an important tool in the fight against crime and in efforts to trace and seize the proceeds of crime.

This is the final step in the procedure for adopting the regulation. The AML regulation will apply three years after its entry into force. Member States will have two years to transpose some parts of the AML directive and three years for others.

AMLA will be headquartered in Frankfurt and will start operations in mid-2025.

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In order to strengthen the European Union’s solidarity and abilities to detect, prepare for and respond to cybersecurity threats and incidents, representatives of the Member States (Coreper) reached a common position on the so-called cyber solidarity act. The draft regulation sets out the Union’s capabilities to make Europe more resilient and reactive to cyber threats, whilestrengthening cooperation mechanisms.

The main objectives of the Commission’s proposal are:

• To support detection and awareness of significant or large-scale cybersecurity threats and incidents.
• To strengthen threat preparedness and protect critical entities and essential services, such as hospitals and public utilities.
• To boost solidarity at the EU level, concerted crisis management and response capabilities among Member States.
• To help ensure a secure digital landscape for both citizens and businesses.

With the aim of identifying major cyber threats quickly and effectively, the draft regulation establishes a European cyber shield, which is a pan-European infrastructure consisting of national and cross-border security operations centres across the Union. They are entities in charge of sharing information to detect cyber threats and take action.

This draft also envisages the creation of a cyber emergency mechanism to increase incident preparedness in the EU and improve response capabilities. It is planned to support:

• Preparedness actions, such as testing entities in highly critical sectors (healthcare, transport, energy, etc.) to detect potential vulnerabilities based on common risk scenarios and methodologies.
• Incident response services from trusted private sector providers pre-contracted and therefore ready to intervene, at the request of a Member State or EU institutions, bodies and agencies, in the event of a major or large-scale problem resulting from a cybersecurity incident.
• Mutual assistance in financial terms, where one member state could offer support to another.

Lastly, the proposed regulation establishes the cybersecurity incident review mechanism with the aim of improving EU resilience by reviewing and assessing significant or large-scale incidents after they have taken place, drawing lessons learned and, where appropriate, giving out recommendations to improve the EU’s cyber stance. At the request of the Commission or national authorities, the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) would review selected incidents and deliver a report with lessons learned and necessary recommendations.

Throughout the text, the voluntary nature of the involvement of the Member States in the mechanisms established by the Commission’s proposal has been emphasised and the interactions between the existing entities and those defined by the draft regulation have been clarified.

The agreement on the Council’s common position will allow the incoming presidency to open negotiations with the European Parliament on the final version of the proposed legislation.

The total budget for all the Union’s cyber solidarity actions amounts to €1.1 billion, of which approximately two thirds will be financed by the EU through the digital Europe Program.

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