Marseille is experiencing an escalation of violence linked to drug trafficking that has generated what authorities, legal professionals, and community actors describe as a collective psychosis: a state of constant fear, social trauma, and a perception of the State’s loss of control over parts of the urban territory. The most alarming element of this crisis is the rise in murders of minors and the increasing role of adolescents, even children, both as victims and as coerced actors within criminal networks.

The case that has recently shaken public opinion is the murder of Adel, a 15-year-old boy, executed with a shot to the head and subsequently burned on a beach in the city. His body was discovered by other children who were going to school, an episode that symbolises to what extent violence has become normalised and has turned public, visible, and seemingly arbitrary.

According to data from the French Ministry of Justice, the number of minors involved in drug trafficking has quadrupled in the last eight years. In Marseille, drug trafficking has evolved into a fragmented yet highly competitive model, where a dominant organisation (the so-called DZ Mafia) operates through a franchise-type structure, with multiple points of sale managed by young recruits, often through social networks.

This new criminal ecosystem is characterised by:

• Disappearance of traditional codes of organised crime (not attacking during the day, not exposing bodies, not involving minors).
• Extreme and demonstrative violence, including public executions, burned bodies, and the dissemination of videos on social networks.
• Mass recruitment of minors, many of whom are migrants or vulnerable adolescents, often subjected to coercion, fictitious debts, and physical violence.

Local actors describe a situation of criminal anarchy, where the logic of fear has replaced any stable hierarchy. Young people, exposed daily to violent deaths, have lost both the fear of killing and the fear of dying.

The murder of Mehdi Kessaci, a 20-year-old probationary police officer with no links to drug trafficking, marked a turning point. It is believed that his death was an intimidating message directed at his brother, Amine Kessaci, an anti-drug activist and emerging figure in the local political arena. This case reinforces the perception that even institutional actors or their family members are not beyond the reach of gangs.

Lawyers, journalists, and activists have begun to reduce or abandon their activities, or to carry them out under police protection for fear of retaliation. Some legal professionals openly claim that the rule of law has been subordinated to the power of gangs in certain neighbourhoods.

In light of this situation, the authorities have intensified police operations through what they call “security bombings»: massive and repeated interventions in high-crime areas, with riot units, closure of sales points, and constant arrests.

These figures show significant activity:

• More than 40 recently dismantled points of sale.
• €42 million in seized criminal assets in one year.
• An estimate of up to 20,000 persons directly or indirectly involved in the drug trade in Marseille.
• A national drug trafficking market valued at 7 billion euros annually.

However, even police officials and prosecutors acknowledge that many of those detained are exploited youths, some held against their will, and that repression does not stop the constant flow of new recruits.

One of the most concerning elements is the open use of TikTok and other social media to advertise the sale of drugs and recruit minors with seemingly legitimate «job» offers. High earnings are promised (€200-500 daily), but the reality is often one of modern slavery, with violence, sexual abuse, and threats against families.

The crisis has reopened an intense political debate. Far-right sectors demand a state of emergency, greater powers for the police, and severe immigration restrictions, attributing the problem to mass immigration and the failure of integration. Other voices such as lawyers, experts and journalists reject this interpretation and warn against the use of fear as a political tool. They argue that violence is the result of decades of social neglect, structural poverty, corruption, and failed public policies, and that police repression only addresses the symptoms, not the causes.

Marseille exemplifies a hybrid security crisis, where organised crime, social exclusion, digitalisation of crime, and weakening of institutional trust converge. The psychosis spreading through the city is not just fear of violence, but the feeling that the social order is eroding and that traditional solutions are no longer sufficient.

For security experts, the case of Marseille raises a key question: how to regain control without fuelling a spiral of repression that ends up exacerbating the very problem that one seeks to resolve.

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A large-scale police action, carried out as part of operation Fabryka, coordinated by Europol, led to the dismantling of a criminal network operating throughout the European Union. Coordinated efforts were carried out in Poland, as well as in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. These actions targeted a network suspected of importing large quantities of precursors used for the production of synthetic drugs in laboratories across several countries.

In addition, the network was involved in money laundering activities to promote its illicit operations. During the course of the investigation, law enforcement authorities determined that the network may have imported over 1,000 tonnes of precursors, enough to produce more than 300 tonnes of synthetic drugs such as MDMA, amphetamine and cathinone.

It is estimated that illegal activities generate billions in criminal profits for the criminal networks involved. The criminal assets flow into the legal economy, creating significant risks of market distortion, unfair competition, and systematic infiltration of legitimate businesses by organised crime.

The investigation began in 2024 based on intelligence shared by the Polish police, specifically by the Drug Crime Unit of the Wrocław Provincial Police Headquarters. The information provided by the police officers from Lower Silesia was critical to initiating the case and facilitating subsequent international cooperation within the taskforce. Between February 2025 and January 2026, more than 20 action days were carried out targeting connected criminal groups, their production facilities, and storage sites across Europe. The operation culminated in a coordinated action day against the alleged wholesale network responsible for the importation and distribution of chemical precursors.

This network was responsible for the importation, repackaging, and distribution of precursors used in the production of synthetic drugs. Chemicals, originating from China and India, entered the EU through various countries and were transported to Poland for repackaging and subsequent distribution in illegal laboratories across the EU. Since the start of the investigation in 2024, Europol supported action days aimed at different cells of the network, as well as connected groups involved in the production of synthetic drugs in laboratories.

The overall results from all action days (from February 2025 to January 2026) include more than:

• 20 action days: 85 arrests; 100 searches; as well as: 50 delivery points identified; 24 industrial-scale laboratories dismantled; 16 storage locations found; multiple seizures:

• About €500,000 in cash.
• 3,559 kilograms and 982 litres of drugs (including 4-CMC, cathinone, MDMA, amphetamine oil).
• More than 120,000 litres of toxic chemical waste.
• 1,000 tons of precursors (chemicals used for the production of synthetic drugs).

The operational structure of this criminal network was complex, with seven legitimate companies in Poland facilitating import and distribution activities, and a high-level leadership coordination connecting the various criminal groups from EU countries.

In some cases, the criminal cells operating within the broader network managed both the logistics for the supply of precursors and the coordination of production in clandestine laboratories. The main criminal network targeted by this investigation is predominantly composed of Polish nationals, with the involvement of some Belgian and Dutch citizens operating within interconnected groups.

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European and South American law enforcement authorities continue to intensify their efforts to dismantle the main criminal networks responsible for cocaine trafficking to Europe. Three recent operations, coordinated with the support of Europol, highlight both the complexity of the routes used by organised crime and the growing importance of international cooperation to address it. These actions have affected networks with connections to Colombia, Brazil, and Greece, and have allowed interventions at all stages of the criminal chain: from the origin of the drugs to their reception on the European continent.

The first investigation focused on a network led by a Dutch citizen who had direct contact with high-level traffickers in Colombia. The individual, 56 years old, resided in Ibiza but frequently travelled to The Netherlands and other European countries. According to the authorities, he coordinated the entry of large shipments of cocaine into Europe with the active support of his two sons.

The case came to light as a result of information obtained from the encrypted platform Sky ECC, a tool widely used by criminal organisations and which has been key in numerous European investigations. Based on this data, the Dutch police deployed surveillance operations, intelligence analysis, and wire-taps that allowed for the identification of ongoing attempts to coordinate new shipments.

The network was linked to six cocaine shipments intercepted in the United Kingdom, Spain and the Netherlands. On 2 December 2025, the main suspect was arrested in Ibiza, while his children, aged 31 and 23, were arrested in The Hague and Haarlem.

Major Brazilian operation against large-scale maritime trafficking

The second operation targeted a Brazilian criminal organisation specialised in large-scale maritime cocaine transport in Europe. The group was responsible for acquiring vessels, training crews, and modifying fishing boats to hide the drugs.

The routes used included departure points on the Brazilian coast and an intermediate stage in West Africa, before the final transfer to European waters.

A key moment in the investigation took place in November 2024, when Portuguese authorities, in collaboration with the Brazilian federal police and authorities from Cape Verde, intercepted a Brazilian-flagged fishing vessel off the west coast of Cape Verde. 1.6 tonnes of cocaine were found on board and six crew members were arrested.

Subsequently, in September 2025, law enforcement dismantled the European branch of the network, with 37 arrests in Spain, including the person responsible for the logistics infrastructure. Finally, on 11 December 2025, a coordinated operation in Brazil culminated in eight new arrests, including two high-value targets, and the seizure of assets worth over 1.5 million euros.

Greek criminal network and at-sea transfers

The third operation targeted a Greek criminal network that used the at-sea transfer method for cocaine trafficking. The group deployed a fishing vessel that left Greece, travelled a route passing through West Africa, and crossed the Atlantic to pick up a shipment from Latin America.

On 14 December 2025, authorities arrested ten suspects: five crew members at sea and five individuals in Greece, including one high-value target.

The key role of Europol and international cooperation

In both cases, Europol acted as the central hub of international cooperation, facilitating the exchange of information, providing analytical support, and coordinating operational meetings among the involved countries. Other key agencies such as Frontex and MAOC-(N) also participated, especially in maritime operations.

These actions are part of the broader European Union strategy against organised crime, coordinated through the EMPACT platform. The cases demonstrate that only through sustained, multilevel, and transnational cooperation is it possible to effectively tackle the structures that support cocaine trafficking to Europe.

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For more than fifteen years, Vyacheslav Penchukov – known in the digital underworld as Tank– was one of the most enigmatic and sought-after figures in international cybercrime. Charismatic, unpredictable, and astonishingly sociable, Penchukov did not stand out for exceptional technical skill, but rather for an innate ability to gain trust and build networks of collaborators. From Englewood prison in Colorado, where he is serving two nine-year sentences, he has given his first extensive interview, revealing unprecedented details about the operations, alliances, and mindset of the cyber gangs that have sown global chaos for two decades.

The story of Penchukov begins far from the Rocky Mountains that surround Englewood. In Donetsk (Ukraine), teenage hacking began by looking for tricks for video games such as FIFA 99 or Counter-Strike. Over time, this informal learning led him to head Jabber Zeus, a group that, in the late 2000s, used the sophisticated malware Zeusto infiltrate bank accounts of companies, municipalities, and NGOs. In just three months, more than 600 British victims lost over £4 million.

Tank was then a twenty-five-year-old man living among luxury German cars, late-night DJ sessions, and a secret office where he and his team stole money during six or seven-hour shifts. As explained, at that time cybercrime was easy money: unprotected banks, overwhelmed police, and a digital world that was poorly prepared.

But the party ended when the FBI intercepted their conversations on Jabber and discovered their identity from a banal detail: the birth of their daughter. An international operation, Trident Breach, resulted in multiple arrests, but Tank escaped thanks to a tip-off and the speed of his Audi S8 with a Lamborghini engine. After hiding for a while, he tried to reform himself by managing a coal business. However, the constant bribery of Ukrainian officials and the impact of the war in the Donbass pushed him back into criminal activity.

Starting in 2018, Penchukov returned with more strength, now immersed in the ransomware ecosystem, a business much more lucrative than traditional bank robbery. He was part of well-known groups such as Maze, Egregor, Conti, or IcedID, specialising in infecting corporate systems, extorting companies, and even hospitals. In his opinion, the profits could reach $200,000 per month, although there were rumours of million-dollar ransoms circulating within the criminal forums.

The hacker community, as explained, operates on a herd mentality: when a group achieves an exceptional haul, hundreds of imitators launch similar attacks without considering the human consequences. And for many of these offenders, victims are just numbers, and the damages are matters covered by insurance.

One of the most controversial aspects of his testimony is the natural confirmation that several ransomware groups maintained regular contacts with Russian security services, including the FSB. This hypothesis had already been pointed out by multiple Western agencies, but Tank describes these connections as common practice.

He also speaks of his former relationship with Maksim Yakubets, alleged leader ofEvil Corpoand subject of a $5 million bounty. They were friends, going out together in Moscow, and Yakubets, apparently obsessed with showing off his wealth, was surrounded by bodyguards. But when Yakubets was arrested in 2019, the cybercrime community turned its back on him. Penchukov claims that he himself avoided it out of fear of being related to it.

The capture of Penchukov in 2022 was worthy of a film: an operation in Switzerland with snipers on the rooftops, hooded agents, and his children as unwitting witnesses. He still considers that the operation was excessive, but the thousands of victims who have lost savings, jobs, or stability would likely disagree.

In Englewood, Tank spends his days studying languages, playing sports, and obtaining secondary school qualifications. In the final stretch of his confession, Penchukov admits that his downfall came from the very collaborators with whom he had shared fortune and risk. In cybercrime, he says, you can’t have friends. Everyone distrusted everyone; many, when they were arrested, became informants. Paranoia is the only constant in the criminal world.

Now, as he awaits a possible sentence reduction and faces a restitution order of $54 million, Tank looks back with a mix of pride, nostalgia, and justification. He speaks of the past with an almost romantic tone, like a distant adventure. But the traces of his legacy—ruined businesses, paralysed hospitals, affected families—still live on.

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The world is at a turning point. Illicit economies —from drug trafficking to cybercrime to counterfeiting— are growing and adapting at a speed that challenges governments, institutions and communities. Far from being a marginal phenomenon, organised crime has become a force that erodes democracy, jeopardises state sovereignty and threatens international peace and security.

In this context, the Global Organized Crime Index becomes much more than a measurement tool: it is a mirror that reflects deep trends within states and the international system. And its third edition allows us, for the first time, to follow the evolution of these phenomena over five years.

Data from this year’s edition show key changes in the global criminal economy. One of them is the unstoppable rise of synthetic drugs and cocaine, which are increasingly dominating the markets. This growth responds to criminal actors capable of quickly adapting to:

• changing consumer tastes,
• technological improvements in production,
• and more interconnected traffic networks than ever before.

The Index detects an accelerated increase in non-violent forms of crime, such as:

• financial crimes,
• fraud and digital scams,
• cyber-dependent crimes.

These activities, increasingly integrated into transnational financial and digital systems, do not require violence to cause enormous damage. Companies, governments and citizens end up paying the price.

Another example is counterfeiting, which is growing everywhere, fuelled by inflation, labour instability and trade tensions. When incomes fall, demand for counterfeit products tends to increase.

The Index also reveals that state-linked criminal actors remain the most prevalent. However, it is the foreign actors who are experiencing the most pronounced overall growth. This confirms that organised crime is more mobile, flexible and transnational than ever.

In addition, the private sector —whether willingly or through negligence— has a growing role as a facilitator of crime, especially in areas such as logistics, finance or technology.

Although many criminal markets are expanding, states’ resilience scores have stagnated. A clear example is international cooperation: traditionally a strength but now weakened by a more polarised global system and a retreat from multilateralism.

This is an alarming sign, especially on the 25th anniversary of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Despite this complex picture, the data also offer a message of hope. The Index demonstrates that strengthening key elements of resilience can:

• reduce the influence of criminal actors,
• transform entire communities,
• and lead societies onto more positive paths.

The Index is not only a diagnosis: it is a tool for solutions. It points out vulnerabilities, but also shows avenues for reform, institutional strengthening and civil society empowerment.

In short, the Index provides a shared evidence base for governments, policy makers, NGOs and international actors to turn knowledge into policy and urgency into action. At a time when organised crime is evolving faster than ever, such a global and comparative view is essential to guide future decisions.

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Caller ID spoofing occurs when criminals falsify the information displayed on phones, making the numbers appear legitimate in order to deceive victims. This practice is causing significant financial and social damage, with an estimated loss of 850 million euros per year worldwide.

Europol is calling for a coordinated European response to tackle caller ID spoofing, an increasingly common tool used for online fraud and social engineering scams.

Phone calls and text messages continue to be the main entry point for these scams, accounting for approximately 64% of reported cases. By hiding their true identities and locations, criminals trick victims into revealing personal information, transferring funds or granting access to devices and accounts, making it extremely difficult for law enforcement to track and prosecute them.

Caller ID spoofing is increasingly exploited by organised criminal networks operating in multiple jurisdictions. Fraudsters impersonate banks, government agencies or even family members to gain trust. Some use it for so-called swatting incidents, making fake emergency calls from a victim’s address, triggering large-scale emergency responses.

Research shows the emergence of a «spoofing-as-a-service» business model, which provides ready-made tools to impersonate trusted entities such as law enforcement or financial institutions. Operating from abroad, these networks exploit jurisdictional loopholes to evade detection and prosecution.

The current imbalance, in which identity theft is easy to commit but difficult to investigate, is unsustainable. Europol is urging measures that make it more costly and technically complex for criminals to hide behind false identities, while allowing investigators to act quickly across borders.

A Europol survey conducted in 23 countries revealed significant challenges in implementing measures against caller ID spoofing. This means that the combined population of approximately 400 million people remains susceptible to such attacks.

Law enforcement highlighted the main obstacles as limited cooperation with telecom operators, fragmented regulations and lack of technical tools to identify and block bogus calls.

Europol and its partners have identified three priorities:

• Harmonised technical standards: develop EU-wide mechanisms to trace fraudulent calls, verify legitimate caller IDs and block deceptive traffic.

• Improving cross-border collaboration: strengthening cooperation between law enforcement, regulators and industry to share information and evidence efficiently.

• Regulatory convergence: align national standards to enable legal traceability, clarify legitimate uses of caller ID masking and promote proven anti-fraud tools.

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The unusual escape of 20 inmates linked to the feared Barrio 18 gang has put Guatemala on alert. The escape, which occurred gradually and quietly, has triggered a security crisis, purges in the prison system, and international pressures.

The events occurred in the Fraijanes II prison, a maximum-security facility on the outskirts of Guatemala City, specifically designed to confine gang members. Although the escapes occurred over several weeks, they were not made public until some time had passed.

The situation became even more complicated because it occurred shortly after the United States designated the Barrio 18 gang as a foreign terrorist organisation, equating it with drug cartels and international violent groups.

With only one of the recaptured fugitives —Byron Fajardo Revolorio, alias Black Demon, sentenced to 180 years of confinement— the Guatemalan government has mobilised up to 45,000 police officers and has requested support from Interpol and neighbouring countries, especially Mexico, to locate the offenders.

The reaction from the United States has been swift: its embassy in Guatemala has described the events as completely unacceptable and demands a strong response. Bilateral collaboration already includes facial recognition technology, training for prison officials, and even plans for the construction of a new supermax prison with the support of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

The Minister of the Interior, Francisco Jiménez, has not evaded responsibilities: It is a very serious failure of the prison system. Authorities admit that internal controls were minimal, that there was no technology to verify the identity of inmates, and that there may have been internal complicity or bribery.

The leadership of the prison system was dismissed, including its head, Luis Alfonso Godínez, and prison directors will be required to take a polygraph test to detect links with criminal gangs.

Barrio 18: an Active Threat from Within Prisons

Barrio 18, often compared to MS-13, maintains a strong presence in Guatemala with about 12,000 members, of which 3,000 are imprisoned. Many of their leaders have continued to operate from within prisons, a common practice in Latin American countries, where corruption facilitates the introduction of mobile phones and other illegal means of communication.

A key player in this scenario is Aldo Dupie Ochoa, nicknamed El Lobo, alleged boss of Barrio 18. His recent transfer to another prison provoked altercations in several prisons, until a judge ordered his return to Fraijanes II, something that many analysts believe could have precipitated the collective escape.

This crisis highlights the serious deficiencies of the Guatemalan prison system and the complexity of combating gangs such as Barrio 18. With a combination of internal corruption, insufficient technology, and increasing international pressure, Guatemala faces a major challenge to restore control and prevent these terrorist organisations from operating with impunity from within its walls.

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Reports of sexual assaults and harassment on UK trains have increased by more than 37% since 2015, according to data collected by the BBC through a request for information from the British Transport Police (BTP). Last year alone, 2,661 incidents were recorded in England, Scotland and Wales, a figure that shows the persistence of a growing problem in public transport safety.

Of the cases reported, one in ten involved minors, some under the age of 13. In total, over 22,000 sexual offences related to the UK rail network have been reported in the last ten years.

The authorities point out that part of the increase in the number of reports may be related to greater social awareness and victims being more willing to report. The UK government has stressed that the increase in reported cases does not necessarily imply a real increase in crime but may reflect that more people feel able to report what they have experienced.

However, the British Transport Police acknowledge that the situation is worrying and that incidents continue to be under-reported. Many victims, according to authorities, still hesitate to report out of fear, shame or lack of trust in the system.

To combat the phenomenon, police patrols – including plain clothes officers – have been reinforced in trains and stations. These teams are specifically trained to detect suspicious behaviour, such as people seeking to position themselves near women travelling alone or seemingly vulnerable.

The data show a remarkable increase in cases involving minors: reports of sexual assaults with victims under 18 years of age have tripled in the last decade, from 146 in 2015 to 443 in 2025. In total, there are more than 2,900 reports over ten years involving children or adolescents.

The BTP notes that this trend is partly explained by new investigative techniques and the presence of undercover agents but stresses the need to continue promoting whistleblowing and prevention education.

The case of train conductor Nicholas McMurray, sentenced to seven years in prison for sexually assaulting an 18-year-old female passenger, has been one of the most publicised. The man, an employee of Great Western Railway, was arrested immediately after the report and placed on the sex offender registry for life. The company immediately dismissed him and reiterated its zero tolerance for any such behaviour.

The British government has announced a £17 million investment to improve video surveillance at stations and make it easier to identify suspects. The authorities hope that this measure will help speed up investigations and reduce impunity for criminals.

Police encourage both victims and witnesses to report any incident immediately, even if it may seem minor. Passengers can send a text message to the number 61016 with details of the incident, place and time.

The Rail Delivery Group, a body representing rail companies, shares this position and assures that all reports will be treated with utmost seriousness.

Despite awareness campaigns and increased surveillance, the data show that public transportation is still a place where many women and children do not feel safe. Experts in security and gender equality point out that it is necessary to combine police measures with education, awareness and training of transport workers, as well as to encourage social change that rejects any form of harassment.

Although the number of reports may reflect greater trust in the system, the reality is that thousands of passengers and minors continue to be exposed to intimidation and sexual violence. The struggle to ensure that every journey is safe and respectful remains one of the main challenges facing public transport in the UK today.

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One weak password. That’s all it took for a group of hackers to destroy a 158-year-old British company and put 700 people out of work.

Northamptonshire-based transport company KNP is a tragic example of how cyber-attacks can bring down even established businesses. The case reveals a disturbing reality: thousands of companies in the UK are victims of ransomware, one of the most significant cybercrime threats today.

In 2023, KNP managed a fleet of 500 lorries under the brand name Knights of Old. Despite complying with IT security standards and having insurance against cyber-attacks, the company fell victim to a group called Akira.

As Richard Bilton explains for BBC Panorama, the hackers gained access to the system by guessing an employee’s password. Once inside, they encrypted all data and locked down internal systems, leaving the company completely paralysed.

Although a figure was not specified, a firm specializing in ransomware negotiation estimated that the demand could reach £5 million. KNP was unable to pay. All data were lost. The company went bankrupt.

Richard Horne, CEO of the National Cyber Security Center (NCSC), warns that an urgent response is needed and companies must take serious steps to protect their systems and businesses.

The NCSC, which is part of GCHQ, the UK’s intelligence agency, receives reports of a major cyber attack every day. Their teams are trying to detect and stop hackers before they can deploy ransomware, but the task is daunting.

According to the UK government, there were 19,000 ransomware attacks last year. The average demand is around 4 million pounds, and approximately one third of the companies end up paying.

This type of social engineering was the method used in the case of the Marks & Spencer attack, where the attackers gained access to the systems through telephone manipulation.

According to experts, many of the new hackers start out in the gaming world and end up using their skills in cybercrime. Ransomware can be easily purchased on the dark web and is a quick way to obtain large sums of money with little risk of being caught.

The government is now proposing to prohibit public entities from paying ransomware, and to make private companies have to notify any attack and obtain permission to make any payments.

After losing his company, Paul Abbott, director of KNP, has started giving awareness talks: companies should demonstrate that they have up-to-date systems. As a kind of cyber-MOT.

Consultant Paul Cashmore, who advised KNP after the attack, agrees that this is organised crime. And very little is being done to catch the perpetrators. «It’s devastating».

Conclusion

The KNP case is a warning to all companies: a single weak password can have disastrous consequences. In an increasingly digitised environment, cybersecurity is not an option, it is a critical necessity.

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According to research from the University of Southampton, children in the UK are at an increased risk of being bullied, cyberbullied and having their identity stolen when they grow up if their parents post their photos online.

The so-called sharenting, which consists of documenting a child’s special moments on social networks, has become a common practice. But academics warn that this could bring unexpected danger, as it increases the risk of children becoming victims of cybercrime.

Reporter Shiona McCallum reports for the BBC and warns that the widespread sharing of children’s photos and videos on social media puts their safety, privacy and well-being at risk.

The researchers surveyed more than 1,000 parents in the United Kingdom and then conducted follow-up interviews. They found that 45% of the parents they spoke to were actively posting photos of their children online, while one in six reported that their child had suffered negative consequences.

On the other hand, revealing details such as birthday, address, names of pets, etc. could increase the risk of identity fraud later on.

When parents proudly share photos and information about their children on social networks, they unknowingly put them at risk of danger online (cyberbullying) and in the real world; not only now, but also in the near future.

Sharenting is an invasion of privacy that has long been a controversial topic. One concern is that parents, caregivers, family members and schools are largely unaware that privacy features on social networks can be overridden for certain actions. This research shows that parents overestimate the protection offered by privacy settings.

Criminals have been known to move into the darker parts of the Internet, who presume they can use artificial intelligence to create sexual and nude images of any child from a handful of ordinary photos or videos. These images can be so realistic that they are indistinguishable from the real thing.

Researchers warn that artificial intelligence poses a whole new range of dangers, including the risk of sexual extortion, if the images are used to threaten or blackmail a child.

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