In an article in The Conversation, Felia Allum, a professor of comparative organised crime at the University of Bath, analyses the rise in drug-related murders in France and argues that the country is at a «turning point» in its relationship with organised crime. The case that symbolises this turn is the murder of Mehdi Kessaci, brother of an anti-drug activist in Marseille, a crime interpreted as an intimidating message in the context of an escalation of violence. Between 2023 and 2024, 73 people died in Marseille in incidents related to the drug trade, many of them young individuals recruited online with the promise of quick money. Similar episodes have also occurred in Grenoble, Paris, Nîmes, Montpellier, Nice, and Lyon.

Marseille has become the symbolic epicentre of this crisis. The group that currently dominates part of the drug market in France calls itself Mafia DZ, but Allum stresses that it is not a classic mafia like the Italian ones. It does not conform to the traditional hierarchical structure or the historical model of territorial control and institutional infiltration characteristic of certain Italian organisations. This forces us to avoid simplifications and labels such as «narcostate» or «narcoterrorism,» which may attract media attention but do not always help to understand the phenomenon.

According to the author, organised crime does not appear out of nowhere nor is it imposed solely by force. It takes root when it finds empty spaces that the State and society are not adequately occupying. Historically, mafia structures and cartels have consolidated during periods of profound transformation of the state, as occurred in Italy during the 19th-century unification or in the United States during full industrialisation. In these contexts of accelerated change, institutions were still weak or unstable, and non-state actors filled the power vacuums.

However, in the current French case, it is not a state under construction, but rather a consolidated state immersed in a liberal economic model where social, educational, and economic inequalities have deepened. Allum, drawing inspiration from the political scientist Susan Strange, points out that the authority of the State has eroded in favour of the markets and that the welfare model has become increasingly bureaucratised and privatised. When the social fabric weakens and real opportunities are scarce, criminal networks offer a seemingly attractive alternative: immediate income, identity, respect, and a sense of belonging.

In neighbourhoods with high rates of youth unemployment and school failure, drug trafficking can become a fast track to success, although it is extremely dangerous. Organisations impose their own rules on vendors and recruits, generate parallel economies, and, in some cases, obtain a certain level of social tolerance based on fear or economic dependence. Organised crime does not only operate against the community; it often integrates and establishes complex links.

Faced with this situation, President Emmanuel Macron ‘s government has proposed a set of measures aimed at strengthening the criminal and police response. Among them, the creation of a new national anti-organised crime directorate (PNACO) stands out, with specialised prosecutors to pursue drug trafficking networks at the French and European levels. Witness protection programs are also provided for, along with stricter prison conditions for network leaders and an expansion of asset seizure mechanisms. France looks to the Italian model of the 1990s as a legislative reference.

In addition, the government wants to increase penalties for consumers, with higher fines and possible restrictions such as taking away people’s driving licences or jobs. This strategy is based on the idea that it is necessary to act across the entire chain, from the chiefs to the final demand.

However, Allum warns that reactive and punitive measures alone do not address the structural causes of the problem. Criminal networks have a great capacity for adaptation: when one structure is dismantled, another can emerge, often with operations coordinated from abroad. Without an intervention that addresses inequalities, the lack of opportunities, and the disconnection between institutions and citizens, the phenomenon tends to reproduce itself.

The fight against drug trafficking is not just a matter of police reinforcement or criminal reform. It is also a matter of social cohesion, comprehensive public policies, and rebuilding the bond between the State and the most vulnerable neighbourhoods. Sustainable security is not built solely on increased repression, but on prevention, social investment, and real alternatives for young people who today see the drug market as the only possible horizon.

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Over the past two years, major ports in north-western Europe have seen a notable drop in cocaine seizures. At first glance, this trend could be interpreted as a success for security policies. Ports such as Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg, which for years had been the main gateways for cocaine entering the continent, have stepped up controls, international cooperation and anti-corruption measures. However, a more in-depth analysis reveals a more complex reality: the decline in interventions does not necessarily imply a reduction in trafficking, but rather a transformation of its dynamics.

Market indicators do not point to a shortage. In several Western European countries, wholesale and retail prices have fallen while demand remains stable or is growing. This suggests a scenario of oversupply, consistent with the sustained increase in production in countries such as Colombia. In other words, police pressure has not stopped the flow, but rather forced criminal organisations to innovate.

One clear adaptation is the change in the size of shipments. Large shipments of several tonnes, which are highly profitable but also very risky, have given way to smaller, more frequent shipments. This fragmentation reduces losses in the event of interception and makes detection more difficult using traditional intelligence patterns.

When surveillance increases at one point, trafficking shifts to other routes. This phenomenon, known as the waterbed effect, is already visible in Europe. The tightening of controls in Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg has been accompanied by an increase in activity in ports in the north and east of the continent, as well as in the Baltic region and south-eastern Europe.

This redistribution entails additional risks: the arrival of new criminal players, increased violent competition, pressure on institutions with fewer resources and greater vulnerability to corruption. The result is not less cocaine, but a problem that is more dispersed and difficult to manage in a coordinated manner.

Criminal organisations have also become more sophisticated in their methods of concealment. In addition to trafficking in containers, practices such as hidden discharges into the sea under the hull of ships or the use of liquid and chemically modified cocaine to camouflage it as legal products are observed. Extraction and processing laboratories are also proliferating within European territory, a worrying sign of the illicit value chain moving closer to home.

This phenomenon is accompanied by a growing presence of Latin American criminal organisations in Europe, such as Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital, the Clan del Golfo and the Sinaloa Cartel. Their establishment not only strengthens distribution networks, but also facilitates the transfer of knowledge, contacts and logistical capacity.

Given this scenario, the response cannot be exclusively national. Cooperation and information exchange initiatives are essential. Strengthening Europol’s mandate and enhancing Eurojust’s judicial tools are necessary steps to prevent local success from creating regional vulnerabilities.

The fight against drug trafficking is no longer just a matter of physically intercepting goods, but of intelligence, anticipation and shared strategic vision. The seizure data alone can create a false sense of control. The real challenge is understanding that this is a highly adaptable adversary.

Reducing interventions may seem like a victory, but it could actually be a mirage. Only through sustained cooperation, forward-looking analysis and a comprehensive approach to security can we prevent the problem from simply changing form while continuing to grow.

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Marseille is experiencing an escalation of violence linked to drug trafficking that has generated what authorities, legal professionals, and community actors describe as a collective psychosis: a state of constant fear, social trauma, and a perception of the State’s loss of control over parts of the urban territory. The most alarming element of this crisis is the rise in murders of minors and the increasing role of adolescents, even children, both as victims and as coerced actors within criminal networks.

The case that has recently shaken public opinion is the murder of Adel, a 15-year-old boy, executed with a shot to the head and subsequently burned on a beach in the city. His body was discovered by other children who were going to school, an episode that symbolises to what extent violence has become normalised and has turned public, visible, and seemingly arbitrary.

According to data from the French Ministry of Justice, the number of minors involved in drug trafficking has quadrupled in the last eight years. In Marseille, drug trafficking has evolved into a fragmented yet highly competitive model, where a dominant organisation (the so-called DZ Mafia) operates through a franchise-type structure, with multiple points of sale managed by young recruits, often through social networks.

This new criminal ecosystem is characterised by:

• Disappearance of traditional codes of organised crime (not attacking during the day, not exposing bodies, not involving minors).
• Extreme and demonstrative violence, including public executions, burned bodies, and the dissemination of videos on social networks.
• Mass recruitment of minors, many of whom are migrants or vulnerable adolescents, often subjected to coercion, fictitious debts, and physical violence.

Local actors describe a situation of criminal anarchy, where the logic of fear has replaced any stable hierarchy. Young people, exposed daily to violent deaths, have lost both the fear of killing and the fear of dying.

The murder of Mehdi Kessaci, a 20-year-old probationary police officer with no links to drug trafficking, marked a turning point. It is believed that his death was an intimidating message directed at his brother, Amine Kessaci, an anti-drug activist and emerging figure in the local political arena. This case reinforces the perception that even institutional actors or their family members are not beyond the reach of gangs.

Lawyers, journalists, and activists have begun to reduce or abandon their activities, or to carry them out under police protection for fear of retaliation. Some legal professionals openly claim that the rule of law has been subordinated to the power of gangs in certain neighbourhoods.

In light of this situation, the authorities have intensified police operations through what they call “security bombings»: massive and repeated interventions in high-crime areas, with riot units, closure of sales points, and constant arrests.

These figures show significant activity:

• More than 40 recently dismantled points of sale.
• €42 million in seized criminal assets in one year.
• An estimate of up to 20,000 persons directly or indirectly involved in the drug trade in Marseille.
• A national drug trafficking market valued at 7 billion euros annually.

However, even police officials and prosecutors acknowledge that many of those detained are exploited youths, some held against their will, and that repression does not stop the constant flow of new recruits.

One of the most concerning elements is the open use of TikTok and other social media to advertise the sale of drugs and recruit minors with seemingly legitimate «job» offers. High earnings are promised (€200-500 daily), but the reality is often one of modern slavery, with violence, sexual abuse, and threats against families.

The crisis has reopened an intense political debate. Far-right sectors demand a state of emergency, greater powers for the police, and severe immigration restrictions, attributing the problem to mass immigration and the failure of integration. Other voices such as lawyers, experts and journalists reject this interpretation and warn against the use of fear as a political tool. They argue that violence is the result of decades of social neglect, structural poverty, corruption, and failed public policies, and that police repression only addresses the symptoms, not the causes.

Marseille exemplifies a hybrid security crisis, where organised crime, social exclusion, digitalisation of crime, and weakening of institutional trust converge. The psychosis spreading through the city is not just fear of violence, but the feeling that the social order is eroding and that traditional solutions are no longer sufficient.

For security experts, the case of Marseille raises a key question: how to regain control without fuelling a spiral of repression that ends up exacerbating the very problem that one seeks to resolve.

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