The white mirage: less cocaine intercepted, more criminal adaptation

Over the past two years, major ports in north-western Europe have seen a notable drop in cocaine seizures. At first glance, this trend could be interpreted as a success for security policies. Ports such as Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg, which for years had been the main gateways for cocaine entering the continent, have stepped up controls, international cooperation and anti-corruption measures. However, a more in-depth analysis reveals a more complex reality: the decline in interventions does not necessarily imply a reduction in trafficking, but rather a transformation of its dynamics.

Market indicators do not point to a shortage. In several Western European countries, wholesale and retail prices have fallen while demand remains stable or is growing. This suggests a scenario of oversupply, consistent with the sustained increase in production in countries such as Colombia. In other words, police pressure has not stopped the flow, but rather forced criminal organisations to innovate.

One clear adaptation is the change in the size of shipments. Large shipments of several tonnes, which are highly profitable but also very risky, have given way to smaller, more frequent shipments. This fragmentation reduces losses in the event of interception and makes detection more difficult using traditional intelligence patterns.

When surveillance increases at one point, trafficking shifts to other routes. This phenomenon, known as the waterbed effect, is already visible in Europe. The tightening of controls in Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg has been accompanied by an increase in activity in ports in the north and east of the continent, as well as in the Baltic region and south-eastern Europe.

This redistribution entails additional risks: the arrival of new criminal players, increased violent competition, pressure on institutions with fewer resources and greater vulnerability to corruption. The result is not less cocaine, but a problem that is more dispersed and difficult to manage in a coordinated manner.

Criminal organisations have also become more sophisticated in their methods of concealment. In addition to trafficking in containers, practices such as hidden discharges into the sea under the hull of ships or the use of liquid and chemically modified cocaine to camouflage it as legal products are observed. Extraction and processing laboratories are also proliferating within European territory, a worrying sign of the illicit value chain moving closer to home.

This phenomenon is accompanied by a growing presence of Latin American criminal organisations in Europe, such as Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital, the Clan del Golfo and the Sinaloa Cartel. Their establishment not only strengthens distribution networks, but also facilitates the transfer of knowledge, contacts and logistical capacity.

Given this scenario, the response cannot be exclusively national. Cooperation and information exchange initiatives are essential. Strengthening Europol’s mandate and enhancing Eurojust’s judicial tools are necessary steps to prevent local success from creating regional vulnerabilities.

The fight against drug trafficking is no longer just a matter of physically intercepting goods, but of intelligence, anticipation and shared strategic vision. The seizure data alone can create a false sense of control. The real challenge is understanding that this is a highly adaptable adversary.

Reducing interventions may seem like a victory, but it could actually be a mirage. Only through sustained cooperation, forward-looking analysis and a comprehensive approach to security can we prevent the problem from simply changing form while continuing to grow.

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French proposal to rent cells abroad as a way to reduce prison overcrowding

The proposal to explore renting cells in foreign prisons in order to address prison overcrowding has sparked intense debate in political, legal and public safety circles. With more than 82,900 inmates for some 62,000 available places, France is in a critical situation. According to data from the Council of Europe, it is one of the countries with the highest overcrowding rates on the continent, behind only Cyprus and Romania. Faced with this scenario, the executive is studying options that until recently seemed unthinkable.

The idea is not new in Europe. Between 2010 and 2016, Belgium rented 680 prison places in Tilburg, in the Netherlands, in a model in which Dutch staff operated under Belgian law. More recently, in 2021, Denmark signed an agreement with Kosovo to transfer 300 inmates there for ten years, at an estimated cost of approximately €200 per prisoner per day. These precedents demonstrate that the model is viable on paper, but they also highlight its practical limitations.

From a security and prison management perspective, the challenges are considerable. Firstly, there is the legal complexity: which legal framework applies? How are the fundamental rights of inmates guaranteed? The Belgian experience showed that specific staff training and close coordination between administrations are necessary. Secondly, logistical costs may be higher than anticipated, particularly with regard to transport, supervision and contract management.

Another critical factor is the impact on reintegration. Several prison system professionals warn that removing inmates from their family and social environment can hinder rehabilitation and increase the risk of reoffending. Visits are complicated by distance and, in some cases, by administrative requirements. Moreover, training and job placement programmes may lose their effectiveness if they are not coordinated with the labour market in the country of origin.

The debate also has a budgetary dimension. France already spends between €100 and €250 per day per inmate, depending on the type of facility. Outsourcing facilities may seem like a quick solution, but it is not necessarily more economical. In a context of pressure on public finances, any decision must be justified on the basis of cost-efficiency and long-term sustainability criteria.

At the same time, the judicial authorities have proposed building modular units for short sentences, while the President has reiterated his willingness to speed up the creation of 5,000 new places. However, trade unions and experts insist that expanding prison capacity does not solve the root of the problem: the excessive use of prison as a criminal justice response.

They propose promoting alternative sentences, mental health programmes and addiction treatment to reduce prison admissions and repeat offences.

The key question is whether renting cells abroad really enhances public safety or simply displaces the problem. European experience suggests that this is a complex measure, with operational and reputational risks, which can only work within a comprehensive criminal justice reform strategy. Without structural changes in criminal policy and reintegration, there is a risk of turning an emergency solution into an expensive and controversial stopgap.

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Marseille in a state of psychosis: drug trafficking and extreme violence

Marseille is experiencing an escalation of violence linked to drug trafficking that has generated what authorities, legal professionals, and community actors describe as a collective psychosis: a state of constant fear, social trauma, and a perception of the State’s loss of control over parts of the urban territory. The most alarming element of this crisis is the rise in murders of minors and the increasing role of adolescents, even children, both as victims and as coerced actors within criminal networks.

The case that has recently shaken public opinion is the murder of Adel, a 15-year-old boy, executed with a shot to the head and subsequently burned on a beach in the city. His body was discovered by other children who were going to school, an episode that symbolises to what extent violence has become normalised and has turned public, visible, and seemingly arbitrary.

According to data from the French Ministry of Justice, the number of minors involved in drug trafficking has quadrupled in the last eight years. In Marseille, drug trafficking has evolved into a fragmented yet highly competitive model, where a dominant organisation (the so-called DZ Mafia) operates through a franchise-type structure, with multiple points of sale managed by young recruits, often through social networks.

This new criminal ecosystem is characterised by:

  • Disappearance of traditional codes of organised crime (not attacking during the day, not exposing bodies, not involving minors).
  • Extreme and demonstrative violence, including public executions, burned bodies, and the dissemination of videos on social networks.
  • Mass recruitment of minors, many of whom are migrants or vulnerable adolescents, often subjected to coercion, fictitious debts, and physical violence.

Local actors describe a situation of criminal anarchy, where the logic of fear has replaced any stable hierarchy. Young people, exposed daily to violent deaths, have lost both the fear of killing and the fear of dying.

The murder of Mehdi Kessaci, a 20-year-old probationary police officer with no links to drug trafficking, marked a turning point. It is believed that his death was an intimidating message directed at his brother, Amine Kessaci, an anti-drug activist and emerging figure in the local political arena. This case reinforces the perception that even institutional actors or their family members are not beyond the reach of gangs.

Lawyers, journalists, and activists have begun to reduce or abandon their activities, or to carry them out under police protection for fear of retaliation. Some legal professionals openly claim that the rule of law has been subordinated to the power of gangs in certain neighbourhoods.

In light of this situation, the authorities have intensified police operations through what they call “security bombings”: massive and repeated interventions in high-crime areas, with riot units, closure of sales points, and constant arrests.

These figures show significant activity:

  • More than 40 recently dismantled points of sale.
  • €42 million in seized criminal assets in one year.
  • An estimate of up to 20,000 persons directly or indirectly involved in the drug trade in Marseille.
  • A national drug trafficking market valued at 7 billion euros annually.

However, even police officials and prosecutors acknowledge that many of those detained are exploited youths, some held against their will, and that repression does not stop the constant flow of new recruits.

One of the most concerning elements is the open use of TikTok and other social media to advertise the sale of drugs and recruit minors with seemingly legitimate “job” offers. High earnings are promised (€200-500 daily), but the reality is often one of modern slavery, with violence, sexual abuse, and threats against families.

The crisis has reopened an intense political debate. Far-right sectors demand a state of emergency, greater powers for the police, and severe immigration restrictions, attributing the problem to mass immigration and the failure of integration. Other voices such as lawyers, experts and journalists reject this interpretation and warn against the use of fear as a political tool. They argue that violence is the result of decades of social neglect, structural poverty, corruption, and failed public policies, and that police repression only addresses the symptoms, not the causes.

Marseille exemplifies a hybrid security crisis, where organised crime, social exclusion, digitalisation of crime, and weakening of institutional trust converge. The psychosis spreading through the city is not just fear of violence, but the feeling that the social order is eroding and that traditional solutions are no longer sufficient.

For security experts, the case of Marseille raises a key question: how to regain control without fuelling a spiral of repression that ends up exacerbating the very problem that one seeks to resolve.

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Increase in violence and sex offences at train stations in Germany: data, causes, and challenges

The 2024 annual report of the German Federal Police paints a worrying picture regarding security, especially in train stations and rail transport. Despite the fact that overall crime has decreased, the crimes that generate the most public alarm—violent and sexual—have increased significantly, confirming an upward trend that began in recent years.

According to the report, in 2024, 27,160 violent crimes were recorded at stations and on trains, an increase of 6% compared to the previous year and 51% compared to 2019. This increase is not limited to large cities, but also affects medium-sized, small, and even rural stations, indicating a territorial expansion of the problem. At the same time, sexual crimes such as exhibitionism, sexual harassment, assaults, and rapes increased by 19.2%, a particularly relevant figure due to its direct impact on the perception of insecurity, especially among women and vulnerable groups.

Overall, the Federal Police recorded 381,894 crimes at stations and trains, a figure that represents a global decrease of 10.1% compared to 2023. This apparent contradiction is explained because the reduction mainly affects administrative offences, especially those related to the Residence Law, while serious crimes continue to grow. This is emphasised by Manuel Ostermann, Vice President of the Federal Police Union, who warns that where it really matters—violence, sexual offences, and weapons—the situation is worsening.

Nationally, the trend is repeated: violent crimes have increased by 6.6% and sexual offences by 13% across Germany. It is important to keep in mind that these data only capture reported crimes and do not provide information on judicial proceedings or convictions, which limits the complete interpretation of the phenomenon.

Regarding the causes, the report and the union statements point to various structural factors. On the one hand, there is an increase in social marginalisation, with people increasingly neglected due to the lack of social infrastructure such as social services, educators, and teachers. This context fosters exclusion, domestic violence, and the consumption of alcohol and drugs, elements that frequently appear in the profile of aggressors.

The data confirms that 79% of the perpetrators are men, and that almost half (49%) were under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the offence. Moreover, 53% did not have German nationality, a fact that has fuelled the political and social debate on immigration and security. Ostermann attributes part of the problem to immigration from the main asylum countries, although this approach is controversial and does not always take into account socioeconomic factors, integration, or life context.

Violence affects not only citizens but also police forces. In 2024, 2,967 assaults against federal police officers were recorded, the second highest figure since records began (2001). In total, 804 agents were injured, mostly men. Assaults include punches, kicks, spitting, bites, and blows with objects, and in one out of every eight cases, objects were used as improvised weapons, such as bottles or stones.

In light of this situation, the Federal Police and Deutsche Bahn have reinforced security measures with increased police presence, weapon-free zones, preventive controls, and a system of over 11,000 surveillance cameras. Despite this, police unions demand a greater commitment from the railway company, with more private security personnel, better-lit, cleaner, and modernised stations, and faster investment in infrastructure.

Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt (CSU) has described attacks on police officers as an attack on society as a whole, while Ostermann warns that much has been lost in the last ten years and that Germany faces dark years in terms of security if there is no real improvement in technology, legal framework, human resources, and cooperation between federal and state governments.

In conclusion, the report conveys a clear message: despite the reduction in global crime, safety is deteriorating precisely in the most sensitive areas. Train stations, key spaces for mobility and coexistence, have become critical points that demand comprehensive responses, combining social prevention, investment in security, institutional coordination, and long-term policies that go beyond reactive measures.

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Report on the Complex U.S. Prison System

The report Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2025, prepared by Wendy Sawyer and Peter Wagner, provides a comprehensive and rigorous overview of the incarceration system in the United States, aiming to dismantle persistent myths and provide clear data in an increasingly politicised debate. In a context where security is often used to justify punitive policies, the study demonstrates that many of these measures are not only ineffective but can also worsen public safety.

Currently, nearly 2 million people are incarcerated in the U.S. in a mosaic of systems (state and federal prisons, local jails, juvenile centres, immigration detention, psychiatric hospitals, and others), with a minimum annual cost of $182 billion. However, these figures do not reflect the enormous turnover of the system: each year, more than 7 million people go through pretrial detention, often for minor offences or without a final conviction.

One of the key points of the report is that most people in local jails have not been convicted. They are in pretrial detention because they cannot pay the bail, not because they pose an immediate danger. This extensive use of pretrial detention has a direct impact on security: it breaks family and work ties, exacerbates mental health problems, and increases the likelihood of reoffending.

The study also debunks the idea that prison overcrowding is primarily a consequence of the drug war or private prisons. Although drug-related crimes remain significant (over 360,000 people imprisoned), 4 out of 5 incarcerated individuals are imprisoned for other types of crimes. Moreover, nearly half of the incarcerated population is classified under the legal category of violent crimes, a label that is often misleading and includes conduct without actual physical harm.

From a security perspective, one of the most important conclusions is that mass incarceration does not reduce crime. The data shows that crime rates are at historic lows, despite alarmist political rhetoric. Moreover, long sentences and harsh conditions of confinement do not have a deterrent effect and may have a criminogenic impact, increasing the risk of future offences once the individual is released.

Finally, the report warns against the use of prisons as a substitute for social and health services. Prisons are not suitable spaces for the treatment of mental disorders or addictions, and failure in this area has direct consequences for collective security.

Overall, The Whole Pie 2025argues that smartly reducing incarceration is a security strategy, not a threat. Data-driven policies, prevention, community services, and responses provided to crime are much more effective in building safe societies than the logic of mass punishment.

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A major operation against migrant smuggling in Bulgaria ends with 16 arrests

An investigation led by Bulgaria, conducted in collaboration with the Hellenic police and with the support of Europol, has resulted in the dismantling of an organised criminal network involved in smuggling migrants from Turkey through Bulgaria and subsequently through Serbia or Romania to countries in Western Europe. The investigation was conducted within the framework of a regional operational task force established to combat smuggling networks that use Bulgaria as a trafficking country.

The police action day resulted in 16 arrests, 6 house and business searches, and the seizure of mobile devices, administrative documents, vehicle registration documents, accounting notebooks, and other records.

The migrant smuggling network operated with a pyramid structure, with members performing different roles. The core group, based in Sofia, was primarily composed of Bulgarian and Syrian nationals who acted in a highly coordinated manner. Their main role was to organise trafficking through Bulgaria while maintaining close cooperation with other criminal networks based in neighbouring countries. For example, payment for smuggling services had already been arranged before departure. Migrants were required to make a deposit through hawala offices in Turkey, from where the migrants departed.

After recruiting migrants in Turkey, the members of the criminal network smuggled them across the southern green border of Bulgaria, guiding them to predefined locations. From there, the drivers transported them to Sofia using a variety of vehicles, including cars and buses. Migrants were temporarily housed in safe houses in Sofia and its surrounding areas before being moved towards the Bulgarian-Serbian or Bulgarian-Romanian borders. In some cases, the migrants were transported directly to the border areas without temporary accommodation.

Europol carried out a wide-ranging operational analysis to identify the various targets and map their criminal activities. Europol deployed an expert in Sofia as part of the regional operational task force and was on the ground during the action day, providing real-time cross-checks with Europol databases to support the national law enforcement authorities.

Since its establishment in September 2023, Europol has been providing dedicated operational and analytical support to the operational task force led by Bulgaria. Europol organised and coordinated numerous operational meetings among stakeholders and facilitated the exchange of operational data.

Migrant smuggling continues to be a very significant criminal threat in the EU, requiring coordinated action across the entire criminal chain, from recruitment and trafficking to the financial flows that support it. Europol supports investigations through a data-driven approach, enhancing cases provided by national authorities with operational analysis and expertise. Europol also facilitates the exchange of information and coordinates joint operations to dismantle criminal networks.

To reinforce Europol’s efforts to combat migrant smuggling, Regulation (EU) 2025/2611 was adopted in December 2025. This new EU legislation underscores the importance of addressing migrant smuggling at the EU level through enhanced cooperation, including the establishment of the European Centre against Migrant Smuggling (ECAMS).

When creating the ECAMS, Europol’s priority is to ensure a better systematic exchange of information and improved coordination of efforts. This includes strengthening expertise in open-source intelligence (OSINT) and financial investigations, as well as improving the operational impact of the network of liaison officers from Frontex, Eurojust, and the Member States.

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The White Paper on Policing: Towards a New Security Model in England and Wales

The UK government has presented the White Paper “From Local to National: A New Model for Policing“, which establishes the most profound reforms of the police system since its professionalisation two centuries ago. Announced by the Home Secretary, Shabana Mahmood, these measures aim to adapt the police to an increasingly complex, digital, and transnational criminal environment, while strengthening community policing and citizen trust.

One of the pillars of the reform is the structural review of the police map. Currently, England and Wales have 43 local forces, a model that the government considers fragmented and inefficient. The White Paper proposes to drastically reduce this number through mergers, with the aim of improving efficiency, reducing costs, and ensuring a more coherent and homogeneous response throughout the territory.

This reorganisation aims to free up resources to strengthen Neighbourhood Policing and the fight against local crime, returning the police to its fundamental principles: visible presence, community knowledge, and rapid response to incidents.

The most ambitious reform is the creation of a new National Police Service, designed to tackle the most serious and complex crimes, such as organised crime, terrorism, digital crime, and threats that transcend local borders.

This new service will integrate, under a single structure, capabilities that have until now been dispersed, such as the National Crime Agency, Counter-Terrorism policing, regional organised crime units, road policing, and police air services. The result will be a national force with improved capacity to share intelligence, technology, and resources.

At the head of the National Police Service, there will be a national commissioner, who will become the highest police authority in the country. One of its key functions will be to take over the centralised management of forensic policing, including digital forensics, to reduce delays —currently with tens of thousands of devices pending analysis— and ensure uniform technical standards.

The new national model will eliminate the duplication of recruitment and technology acquisition processes. Instead of each force purchasing its own equipment, the National Police Service will acquire materials and ICT systems centrally, generating economies of scale.

The Government estimates that these measures will allow for savings of up to 350 million pounds, which will be reinvested directly in frontline policing and in the fight against crime.

The White Paper significantly reinforces accountability mechanisms. Ministers will have new powers to intervene in underperforming forces, including the ability to dismiss police chiefs who do not meet the required standards.

Clear and comparable indicators on response times, crime resolution, victim satisfaction, and public trust will be introduced. These results will be published and will allow citizens to compare the performance of the forces.

At the same time, the individual standards of rural agents will be strengthened by:

  • mandatory and stricter verification controls,
  • exclusion from the profession of individuals with a history of violence against women and girls,
  • mandatory suspension of agents under investigation for these crimes,
  • and the introduction of a renewable professional license, similar to that of other regulated professions.

The reform establishes new national response objectives: arrival at serious incidents within a maximum of 15 minutes in urban areas and 20 minutes in rural areas, and response to emergency calls in less than 10 seconds.

In addition, the Neighbourhood Police Guarantee is expanded, ensuring that each electoral district has assigned, identifiable, and accessible officers with a deep understanding of local issues. The Government is also promoting a programme to recruit university graduates, inspired by the Teach First model, to attract young talent to community policing roles.

With an investment of over £140 million, the Government is committed to police technology. They highlight the expansion of live facial recognition, the deployment of artificial intelligence tools to analyse images and digital evidence, and the creation of the national centre Police.

These tools will reduce bureaucratic burdens and return millions of hours of work to the front line of policing, increasing the presence of officers on the street.

Finally, the White Paper introduces new national leadership in public order, with the capacity to coordinate resources in situations of serious disorder, and significantly strengthens support for the mental health of the officers. There is also a goal to revitalize the Special Police, particularly by incorporating technical profiles and cybersecurity experts, to more effectively combat modern crime.

Overall, the White Paper outlines a profound structural change: a more centralised police force for major crimes, closer to citizens at the local level, with higher standards, more technology, and stricter governance. An ambitiously designed model to respond to the security challenges of the 21st century.

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Europol report: evolution of tactics in maritime cocaine trafficking operations

A new Europol report provides a comprehensive analysis of the new tactics employed by criminal networks to traffic cocaine to Europe via maritime routes. The document, ‘Diversification in Maritime Cocaine Trafficking Modi Operandi’, provides an in-depth analysis of the different tactics employed by organised criminal networks, which continue to exploit vulnerabilities and evade detection.

Cocaine trafficking in Europe has reached unprecedented levels, driven by high production in Latin America and increasing demand within the EU. Criminal networks have demonstrated their ability to quickly adjust operations, fragmenting routes and adopting complex and covert trafficking methods. This new Europol report highlights the use of semi-submersibles and other non-commercial vessels, as well as the incorporation of cocaine into various transport materials before shipment to Europe.

Transfers at sea often involve a mother vessel from Latin America transferring cocaine to a daughter vessel off the coast of West Africa. Cocaine is unloaded in West Africa for subsequent shipment to continental EU or sent to the Canary Islands. Using rigid-hulled inflatable boats, criminal networks also transport cocaine directly to mainland Spain. Upon reaching the Andalusian coast, criminal networks use the Guadalquivir River to transport cocaine inland for further distribution.

A prominent example of these new tactics is illustrated by a recent operation codenamed ‘Sombra Negra’ which exposed a significant shift in drug trafficking methods. Led by the Spanish authorities and with the support of Europol, this operation resulted in the arrest of 101 suspects and the seizure of more than 10 tonnes of cocaine on the Iberian Peninsula.

The operation highlighted a shift in drug trafficking methods, as the criminal network relied on advanced maritime infrastructures to transport large quantities of cocaine from South America to Europe via the Iberian Peninsula. The suspects used high-speed vessels capable of exceeding 70 km/h and complex encrypted communication systems to evade law enforcement. The operation represented a decisive blow to one of the largest cocaine trafficking organisations in Europe and underscored a regional shift from cannabis trafficking to cocaine trafficking.

This operation exemplifies the main findings of the report, which include:

• Diversified routes and methods: criminal networks are avoiding major commercial ports by using depots and transfers at sea, semi-submersibles, and non-commercial vessels. These methods allow them to evade the presence and controls of law enforcement, making detection and interception difficult.

• Sophisticated concealment: cocaine is increasingly hidden in industrial equipment, machinery, and transport materials such as food, plastics, and textiles. These methods make detection by scanners, sniffer dogs, and forensic tests extremely difficult.

• Technological advancements: criminal networks are taking advantage of advanced technologies, including encrypted communication systems, autonomous vessels, and drones, to enhance their operations and evade detection.

The report also highlights the need to improve maritime surveillance, financial investigations, and forensic expertise to expose hidden compartments, chemically incorporated drugs, and extraction laboratories. Collaborations between law enforcement, customs, port authorities, and the private sector are essential to secure supply chains and share data in real time.

Europol’s response to the threat of cocaine trafficking includes operational support through its specific Drugs Unit, analytical and coordination support, and the deployment of experts on the ground. The strategic role of the Agency in providing an EU perspective on the various threats posed by drug trafficking criminal networks is crucial for identifying changes in criminal behaviour and trafficking routes.

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24 industrial-scale laboratories dismantled in the largest operation against synthetic drugs in history

A large-scale police action, carried out as part of operation Fabryka, coordinated by Europol, led to the dismantling of a criminal network operating throughout the European Union. Coordinated efforts were carried out in Poland, as well as in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. These actions targeted a network suspected of importing large quantities of precursors used for the production of synthetic drugs in laboratories across several countries.

In addition, the network was involved in money laundering activities to promote its illicit operations. During the course of the investigation, law enforcement authorities determined that the network may have imported over 1,000 tonnes of precursors, enough to produce more than 300 tonnes of synthetic drugs such as MDMA, amphetamine and cathinone.

It is estimated that illegal activities generate billions in criminal profits for the criminal networks involved. The criminal assets flow into the legal economy, creating significant risks of market distortion, unfair competition, and systematic infiltration of legitimate businesses by organised crime.

The investigation began in 2024 based on intelligence shared by the Polish police, specifically by the Drug Crime Unit of the Wrocław Provincial Police Headquarters. The information provided by the police officers from Lower Silesia was critical to initiating the case and facilitating subsequent international cooperation within the taskforce. Between February 2025 and January 2026, more than 20 action days were carried out targeting connected criminal groups, their production facilities, and storage sites across Europe. The operation culminated in a coordinated action day against the alleged wholesale network responsible for the importation and distribution of chemical precursors.

This network was responsible for the importation, repackaging, and distribution of precursors used in the production of synthetic drugs. Chemicals, originating from China and India, entered the EU through various countries and were transported to Poland for repackaging and subsequent distribution in illegal laboratories across the EU. Since the start of the investigation in 2024, Europol supported action days aimed at different cells of the network, as well as connected groups involved in the production of synthetic drugs in laboratories.

The overall results from all action days (from February 2025 to January 2026) include more than:

• 20 action days: 85 arrests; 100 searches; as well as: 50 delivery points identified; 24 industrial-scale laboratories dismantled; 16 storage locations found; multiple seizures:

  • About €500,000 in cash.
  • 3,559 kilograms and 982 litres of drugs (including 4-CMC, cathinone, MDMA, amphetamine oil).
  • More than 120,000 litres of toxic chemical waste.
  • 1,000 tons of precursors (chemicals used for the production of synthetic drugs).

The operational structure of this criminal network was complex, with seven legitimate companies in Poland facilitating import and distribution activities, and a high-level leadership coordination connecting the various criminal groups from EU countries.

In some cases, the criminal cells operating within the broader network managed both the logistics for the supply of precursors and the coordination of production in clandestine laboratories. The main criminal network targeted by this investigation is predominantly composed of Polish nationals, with the involvement of some Belgian and Dutch citizens operating within interconnected groups.

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Chile: fear, crime, and politics in a security paradox

Chile faces a paradoxical situation in terms of public security: despite having relatively low crime rates compared to other Latin American countries, the perception of insecurity among the population is one of the highest in the world. This contradiction became the central focus of political debate and the presidential electoral campaign, to the point that security is today the main concern among citizens.

Kast’s victory in the recent elections reflects many voters’ response to issues such as public security, illegal immigration and perceptions of insecurity or disagreements with the current economic or social model, which were central themes of the campaign.

According to an Ipsos poll, 63% of Chilean adults identify crime and violence as the issue that concerns them the most, a higher percentage than in countries such as Mexico or Colombia, which have much higher homicide rates. Globally, Chile ranks among the countries most concerned about insecurity and also among those where fewer people feel safe walking around their neighbourhood at night, according to reports by Ipsos and Gallup.

Daniel Johnson, Executive Director of the Paz Ciudadana Foundation, points out that with 6 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, the country is far from leading the statistics on violence in the region or the world.

Historically, Chile already had higher levels of fear of crime than the objective data indicated. However, this phenomenon has intensified in recent years, requiring further explanation. Studies by the Paz Ciudadana Foundation show that women and lower socioeconomic sectors express the highest levels of fear, especially in areas where the state’s presence is perceived as weak.

Although thefts and attempted thefts affect approximately one third of households—a figure similar to that of previous years—, what has really changed is the nature of the crime. Violent crime has increased significantly: the homicide rate has nearly doubled in a decade, violent robberies have grown by 25% in eight years, and previously rare crimes such as extortion and kidnappings, have started to gain prominence.

This change in the types of crime has a strong psychological impact on the population. Johnson points out that uncertainty about how to protect oneself against these new crimes significantly increases the feeling of vulnerability.

Another key factor is the expansion of organised crime, with the emergence of new organisations that operate differently from traditional ones. There has been an increase in the use of firearms, a rise in planned homicides, and the presence of transnational groups, some of which are linked to foreign nationals, such as the well-known case of Tren de Aragua.

Although immigration did not show a direct correlation with the increase in crime until 2020, authorities and research centres now observe a clear relationship between certain types of crime and foreign organisations, which often exploit both migrants and the local population. This has reinforced the perception that immigration and insecurity are linked, fuelling public and political debate.

Fear of crime is closely linked to mistrust in security and justice institutions. When citizens perceive that the state is not protecting them adequately, the reporting of crime declines, weakening the system’s response capacity and further eroding its legitimacy. However, Chilean police forces have managed to regain some of the trust lost after the social unrest.

Gabriel Boric’s government responded with significant institutional reforms, such as the creation of a Ministry of Security and mechanisms for inter-ministerial coordination. These measures are designed for the medium and long term, but they contrast with citizens’ demands for immediate responses, such as more patrols, lighting and cameras, although these actions have limited impact if they are not accompanied by structural changes.

In this context, security became a central theme of the electoral campaign. All candidates incorporated the discourse of insecurity, validating and amplifying existing fears. Historically, right-wing parties have prioritised control and repression, while the left has focused more on social policies. Today, however, a logic of urgency prevails, favouring short-term measures over preventive and reintegration policies, which are essential for a lasting solution.

Moreover, violent events in the region, such as large-scale police operations in Brazil and US military actions against drug trafficking, reinforce fears that Chile may follow the same path.

Chile is not one of the most violent countries in the world, but it is one of the most fearful. This gap between reality and perception, fuelled by changes in crime, the presence of organised crime, institutional mistrust and political exploitation, poses a major challenge: how to respond to the emergency without giving up on structural, long-term solutions? The future of security in the country will depend on the ability to combine effective control, institutional reforms and social policies that tackle the root causes of violence.

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