Unprecedented danger: sadistic online gangs threaten teenagers

A recent report by the UK’s National Crime Agency (NCA) has highlighted a growing and alarming threat: sadistic online gangs that exploit and abuse minors. These groups, operating in the anonymity of the web, pose an «unprecedented risk» to teenagers, according to the NCA.

The report highlights that sadistic online gangs have become more sophisticated in their methods of exploitation. They use various social media platforms and messaging applications to contact minors, gain their trust and ultimately abuse them. These gangs may be made up of individuals from different parts of the world, making them difficult to identify and prosecute.

What are these sadistic gangs?

These gangs are made up of individuals who revel in the torture and humiliation of others, especially vulnerable teenagers. They use online platforms, forums and social networks to connect, share abusive material and coordinate attacks.

These gangs are not simply groups of trolls or cyberbullies. They are structured organisations, with defined hierarchies and roles, dedicated to the psychological and, in extreme cases, physical torture of their victims. They use sophisticated techniques to hide their identity and track their prey:

  • Anonymity and encryption: They use Tor networks, VPNs and other tools to hide their IP addresses and locations.
  • Social engineering: They manipulate their victims through the creation of false identities and the generation of trusting relationships.
  • Sharing of abusive material: They exchange videos and images of torture and humiliation, creating a vicious cycle of violence and abuse.
  • Coordination of attacks: They plan and execute coordinated attacks, both online and offline, to maximise the damage to their victims.

Their activities include:

  • Online sexual abuse: Sharing and production of child sexual abuse material.
  • Extreme violence: Promotion of and incitement to acts of physical and psychological violence.
  • Public humiliation: Exposure and dissemination of content that is humiliating for victims.
  • Extortion and blackmail: Threats to obtain money or compromised material.

The scope of the problem

The NCA report reveals that these gangs are on the rise and that their sophistication and reach are increasing. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the problem, as adolescents spent more time on the Internet, increasing their vulnerability to these predators.

Consequences include:

  • Psychological trauma: Anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and suicidal thoughts.
  • Social isolation: Shame, fear and distrust that hinder social relationships.
  • Academic difficulties: Concentration and school performance problems.
  • Substance abuse: Attempt to relieve emotional pain through alcohol and drugs.
  • Self-harm: As a coping mechanism for emotional pain.

The NCA is working with other law enforcement agencies and international organisations to combat this threat. Strategies are being implemented to improve detection and prosecution of these groups, as well as to educate minors and their families about the risks and how to protect themselves.

Useful resources

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The five big security challenges of Generative Artificial Intelligence

Last February, the research organisation RAND published a report authored by Jim Mitre and Joel B. Predd, in which they warn that the emergence of Generative Artificial Intelligence (GAI) is a real possibility that the U.S. national security community should be taking seriously.

The report identifies five major challenges that Generative Artificial Intelligence may pose to U.S. national security. (1) the development of wonder weapons, (2) systemic shifts in power, (3) the ability of non-experts to create weapons of mass destruction, (4) the emergence of artificial entities with agency, and (5) widespread instability.

All of this poses a number of challenges for strategists and policy and security decision-makers as they try to anticipate the threats and opportunities that could arise both during the process of achieving GAI and once it materialises.

A new technological Manhattan Project?

In 1938, the splitting of the atom started the nuclear arms race. Now, advances in Generative Artificial Intelligence have raised similar fears in the national security sphere. Will it be the next strategic paradigm shift? And, if so, what threats does it pose to global security?

Although GAI is still a hypothesis, its plausibility demands a strategic response from states. The RAND study identifies five major issues that could emerge with the development of GAI:

  • Wonder weapons and first-move advantage

The great fear is that GAI could uncover a revolutionary technological breakthrough, enabling the development of unstoppable cyberweapons, hyper-advanced autonomous systems or perfectly optimised military strategies. This could confer a massive advantage to the first nation to gain control of it.

  • Systemic shift in global power

GAI could alter the balance of power between nations, not necessarily through weapons, but through its ability to improve productivity, accelerate scientific discovery or redefine global economic dynamics. This could lead to a new world order in which the economies most adaptable to GAI consolidate their dominance.

An added risk is that the concentration of GAI development in a few private companies could give them unprecedented power, altering the traditional relationship between states and corporations.

  • Empowerment of non-experts in weapons of mass destruction

If GAI can facilitate the creation of highly lethal biological or cyberweapons, global security will be severely compromised. Current systems have already demonstrated worrying capabilities in this area, and GAI could amplify the risk exponentially.

  • Artificial entities with agency

Loss of control over GAI systems could lead to the creation of autonomous artificial entities capable of acting independently. This could pose a risk to critical decision making in sectors such as defence, economics and critical infrastructure management.

  • Strategic instability

Before GAI fully arrives, the technology race between states and corporations may provoke tensions similar to the Cold War. The perception that an adversary is on the verge of gaining a decisive advantage could trigger pre-emptive reactions, even armed conflict.

Towards a resilient strategy

The United States and its allies have initiated measures to maintain leadership in AI, but they may prove insufficient if GAI develops in a sudden or disruptive manner.

GAI can redefine the future of global security. This is not just a technical challenge, but a strategic revolution that requires an intelligent and proactive response. Decisions made today will determine whether GAI becomes a stabilising force or an unprecedented threat to humanity.

LINK: https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA3691-4.html??cutoff=true&utm_source=AdaptiveMailer&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=7014N000001Snj1QAC&utm_term=00v4N00000X46iFQAR&org=1674&lvl=100&ite=2950 a0wQK00000AqgobYAB

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Artificial intelligence and biosecurity, a double-edged sword

Artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming several fields and biotechnology is no exception. A recent report by the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine highlights the potential of AI to improve biosecurity but also warns of the risks of its misuse.

The beneficial potential of AI in biosecurity

AI can be a powerful tool for public health. AI models can analyse large amounts of data to help design medical countermeasures that prevent, treat and mitigate health threats, such as drug discovery. This may accelerate the development of vaccines and treatments for infectious diseases, both naturally occurring and those caused by intentional acts.

The risks of misuse of AI in biotechnology

However, the report also warns that AI-enabled biological tools could be used for harmful purposes. For example, AI could design new biological agents with pandemic potential or modify existing viruses or bacteria to make them more harmful or transmissible.

Current capabilities and limitations of biological AI tools

The report assesses the current capabilities of biological AI tools to amplify the benefits or risks of applying biological tools. Currently, no biological AI tool is capable of designing an entirely new virus, and its capabilities to modify an existing infectious agent with potential for epidemic- or pandemic-scale consequences are limited.

The report examines three types of harmful applications:

Design of biomolecules, such as toxins: Available biological AI tools can design and redesign toxins using different amino acids. However, the scale of potential threats would likely be limited to the local level.

Modification of existing pathogens to make them more virulent: Biological AI tools can shape very specific characteristics that can predict virulence-related traits.

Design of a completely new virus: No currently available biological AI tool has the capability to design a new virus.

Recommendations for biosecurity in the age of AI

The report offers several recommendations to mitigate the risks of AI misuse in biotechnology:

  • Continuous monitoring and assessment: Government agencies should continually assess and mitigate the risks of AI-enabled biological tools being misused.
  • Strategic data collection: Considering the importance of data for AI model training, the report urges strategic collection of AI-ready biological datasets.
  • Investment in data infrastructure: Building new national data resources and other forms of infrastructure to support AI should be a research priority for the United States to maintain competitiveness and scientific innovation.
  • Investment in research and development: The Departments of Defence, Health and Human Services, Energy, and other U.S. federal agencies should continue to invest in research, data infrastructure and high-performance computing to drive advances in AI and also control potential risks.

Conclusion

AI offers great potential to improve biosecurity and protect us from biological threats. However, it is essential to be aware of the risks of misuse and take proactive measures to mitigate them. Through continuous monitoring, strategic data collection, infrastructure investment and research and development, we can harness the power of AI to make the world a safer place.

Link: https://www.nationalacademies.org/news/2025/03/ai-tools-can-enhance-u-s-biosecurity-monitoring-and-mitigation-will-be-needed-to-protect-against-misuse

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Cybersecurity situation in the European Union

The document is an ENISA report on the state of cybersecurity in the European Union in 2024. Collaboration with the NIS Cooperation Group and the European Commission is highlighted, providing a data-driven overview of cybersecurity at the EU, national and societal levels.

Topics such as the cyber threat landscape, maturity of cybersecurity capabilities, cyber crisis management, supply chain security, and cybersecurity awareness and skills are addressed.

It also includes policy recommendations to improve cybersecurity in the EU, such as strengthening technical and financial support, revising the EU Incident Response Plan, and addressing the cybersecurity skills shortage.

The report includes several policy recommendations to improve cybersecurity in the European Union:

1. Strengthen technical and financial support: It is recommended that further technical and financial support be given to the competent authorities and entities within the scope of the NIS2 Directive to ensure a harmonised and coherent implementation of the EU cybersecurity policy framework.

2. Review the EU Incident Response Plan: It is suggested to review the Incident Response Plan for large-scale cyber incidents, taking into account the latest developments in EU cybersecurity policies, to promote the harmonisation and optimisation of cybersecurity and to strengthen national and EU capabilities.

3. Strengthen the EU’s cyber workforce: Implement the Cybersecurity Skills Academy, establish a common EU approach to cybersecurity training, identify future skills needs and develop a European certification scheme for cybersecurity skills.

4. Address supply chain security: Conduct coordinated risk assessments at the EU level and develop a horizontal policy framework for supply chain security, focusing on both public and private sector cybersecurity challenges.

5. Promote a unified approach: Build on existing policy initiatives and harmonise national efforts to achieve a high common level of cybersecurity and cyber hygiene awareness among professionals and citizens, regardless of their demographics.

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Searching for solutions to protect against mass attacks

Mass attacks, such as the New Year’s Day incident in New Orleans (USA), stir public emotion and have tragic consequences. While the investigations into this case will take some time, it is known that there are things that law enforcement and society can do to mitigate and perhaps stop mass casualty events.

This is the view of Richard H. Donohue and John S. Hollywood who published research on evidence of protection against attacks, as well as an article in Rand. For example, the car ramming in New Orleans that caused the death of 14 people created fear and uncertainty. While it is impossible to say whether these specific incidents could have been prevented, there are ways to make such attacks more difficult.

First of all, we know that layered security works. To complete a high death toll attack, a would-be terrorist must engage in violence, plan, acquire weapons and skills, complete preparations, arrive on scene, breach the site perimeter and internal security measures, and attack a crowd without being stopped quickly. A system-based, or layered, approach puts the odds in favour of law enforcement, since the attacker must be lucky many times to succeed, while defenders would only need to succeed once.

Therefore, security administrators must think systemically about how their sites look and how the layers of security will work collectively. Access and entry control systems, including working external and internal door locks, secured windows and secure entry spaces, such as monitored entry routes and secured vestibules, have helped protect against attackers. On-scene security, as well as aware and engaged bystanders, have also stopped many attacks. In particular, bystanders who take shooters down to the ground have been very effective in ending mass shootings. The «Run, Hide, Fight» or, alternatively, «Avoid, Deny, Defend» strategies have been effective.

Early detection is one of the most important layers of defence. In New Orleans, no specific leads were reported prior to the actual incident. Our research shows that when there is no initial lead, massive attacks are more likely to be completed. However, when there are direct threats, leads, a search or other criminal pursuits, attempts at such attacks are often thwarted, more than 80 percent of the time.

It is important for the public to know the key signs of a possible mass attack plot, especially when someone shows clear and serious intentions to attack and has taken concrete steps to do so. In addition, it is essential that people know where to report suspicious schemes. For policy makers and budget makers, it is crucial to provide training and support to threat assessment teams that follow up on tips. While it is too late to stop the Bourbon Street attack, the attacker released videos describing his initial detailed plans to kill his family, his joining the Islamic State terrorist network and a last will and testament. These are all examples of specific preparations that could have been reported to the authorities prior to the attack.

Other emerging technologies offer various avenues to stop or mitigate damage from attacks, whether they are used to detect and report clear warning signs of plots before they are launched or are integrated to trigger security measures at the first signs that an incident may be coming.

Ultimately, we know that mass attacks will continue. We also know that hardening a target can lead a potential attacker to look for weaknesses and opportunities in another location. However, we are confident that municipalities, law enforcement agencies and the private sector can come together to detect, deter and mitigate threats to the population from terrorism and other targeted violence acts.

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Strengthening school violence prevention in the U.S.

Violence by students at the K-12 level (up to age 14) is disturbingly common. Ensuring that schools have effective ways to identify and prevent these incidents is increasingly important. Various disruptive behaviours or communications, including direct threats, may precede acts of violence.

These reflections are derived from research by several authors such as Brian A. Jackson, Pauline Moore, etc. also published in Rand.

While expulsion of all students exhibiting these behaviours may seem prudent, doing so may be counterproductive, limiting the effectiveness of safety efforts. With effective behavioural threat assessment and management (BTAM) systems in place, schools can assess and respond to behaviour of concern to protect the community and respond to the student whose behaviour has caused concern.

To do this, schools need the tools to respond. Tools may include restrictive measures or the involvement of law enforcement in more serious cases, but other options may be more effective. These additional options include different types of mental health intervention, counselling and other kinds of support. Teams with extensive tools available can better customise their interventions, increasing the likelihood of positive outcomes for all involved.

In this report, the authors draw on published literature and extensive interviews with education and public safety professionals to create an inventory of the many intervention options that are valuable to schools in the BTAM management phase. In addition, drawing on varied approaches from the fields of counselling, school discipline and behaviour management, and other professions that must tailor appropriate services to the needs of the youth in their care, the report discusses decision support tools to help management teams implement this critical part of efforts to prevent targeted violence and sustain school communities.

Several intervention options are available for K-12 BTAM efforts

Through the use of supportive counselling and other interventions, BTAM is expanding the options available to school leaders and staff to address problematic behaviour that has the potential to escalate into violence.

To be effective, school BTAM teams need a broad set of tools that include options tailored to:

  • the specificities of a student’s problem behaviours,
  • the unique community and school environment, and
  • the needs and circumstances of the student(s) involved.

Insights from education, public safety, and other fields can be combined to support the matching of effective interventions to student needs.

Recommendations

To better inform intervention planning, intervention tools should be designed to prioritise the collection of data on factors that can be changed because pieces of information in BTAM, which may be a useful part of assessing the danger posed by an individual, may be useless for intervention planning.

The inventory of intervention options developed in this study could provide a starting point for schools to make conscious decisions as they

  • review the options available for their teams and
  • identify options that they may not have access to but that could become valuable near-term priorities for strengthening their school safety efforts.

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Recidivism in the EU and why we should try to prevent it

Recidivism refers to the act of re-offending after release from prison, parole, or probation. It is a very important concept in criminal justice, as it serves as a key to evaluate the effectiveness of rehabilitation programs, sentencing policies and correctional institutions.

This was stated in a recently published report by the EUCPN – European Crime Prevention Network – on reducing recidivism.

The term encompasses various forms of re-entry into the criminal justice system, such as being arrested, repeatedly convicted or re-imprisoned for committing new offences or violating terms of supervision.

Recidivism rates are often expressed as percentages over a specified period, usually within two to three years of release. For example, if 50 out of every 100 persons released re-offend in a three-year period, the recidivism rate would be 50%.

In the European Union, this diversity in both the definition of recidivism and in the data and collection methods is the reason for the lack of comparable data on recidivism.

A 2020 systematic review of recidivism rates worldwide shows, for example, that Denmark uses reconviction rates at six months, one and two years, while Estonia and France measure recidivism up to five and six years after release.

The overall result is that EU countries, broadly speaking, have two-year recidivism rates of between 30% and 50%. If we add to these recidivism rates that many perpetrators re-offend not just once, but two or more times, we quickly conclude that most crimes are committed by a relatively small number of repeat offenders.

Research in Sweden, based on data relating to all violent offenders from 1973 to 2004 shows that 63% of all those convicted in this period committed a crime by perpetrators with three or more convictions, a group that constitutes 1% of the total population, and a quarter of all criminal violence.

Understanding and addressing recidivism is crucial not only for public safety, but also for reducing the social and economic costs associated with repeated incarceration.

Reducing recidivism rates helps ease the burden on overcrowded prisons and ensures a more effective use of taxpayer resources.

High recidivism rates are often cited as evidence of the current shortcomings of incarceration practices. Several studies have shown that prison sentences, in and of themselves, are not effective in reducing crime and preventing recidivism, or at least are no more effective than non-custodial alternatives. More importantly, critics argue that punitive approaches, such as (long) prison sentences, do not address underlying problems and may even aggravate criminal tendencies by isolating people and exposing them to criminogenic environments.

Prisonisation refers to the negative effect that prison sentences can have on prisoners’ mental health and behaviour, including criminality. The very conditions of prison life can have a negative impact on inmates’ mental health. It is also likely that inmates will lose their social support networks at the same time as there are new links with offenders likely to be forged. Post-release opportunities, especially employment opportunities, are reduced by the mere fact of incarceration.

However, not all recidivism can be explained as a consequence of prisonisation. Recidivism is influenced by a number of factors, both individual and systemic. At the individual level, factors such as substance abuse, lack of education, mental health problems and limited employment opportunities increase the likelihood of recidivism.

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Findings from the 2024 annual report on cybersecurity threats

A few days ago, the 2024 annual cybersecurity threat report was released by Recorded Future, of the Insikt Group. The report analyses the tactics, techniques and procedures of threat actors and their motivations as of 2024 with the aim of informing with data on cyber risk management and giving tools for threat detection.

It generally argues that the cybersecurity landscape in 2024 was shaped by the resilience of criminal networks and the increasing complexity of enterprise attack surfaces due to the growing use of SaaS products, which in numerous cases led to unauthorised access to corporate and institutional data due to the increase in stolen credentials.

It also states that actions to curb ransomware operations had limited impact as criminals adapted to them. In addition, the report exemplifies how several state-sponsored actors used generative AI for information operations and state of opinion creation, especially during elections in more than 70 countries, to facilitate geopolitical objectives.

Predictions for 2025 include developers using AI to achieve more secure codes, the possibility of fraud in the cryptocurrency world that could lead to market destabilisation, and new threats as a result of the implementation of Generative Artificial Intelligence.

Main conclusions

The growing adoption of SaaS (Software as a Service) amplifies the risk of identity exploits, with stolen credentials accessed by malware to steal information that causes significant damage. These data-stealing infections, often targeting personal devices, gained more credentials per infection than in previous years, increasing the risk to SaaS ecosystems.

Extortion groups proliferate despite police action. Law enforcement actions disrupted major criminal ransomware groups, but the criminals reorganised into smaller groups, demonstrating their operational resilience.

Manufacturing, healthcare and construction were the industries most targeted by ransomware groups,reflecting specific targeting patterns by strategic sectors.

Criminal groups associated with Iran, China and Russia targeted critical civilian infrastructure in disruptive cyberattacks, takinga further step in the hybrid conflicts that increasingly dominate the new contemporary wars.

Generative AI accelerates the spread of inauthentic content in a historic election year. Maliciously influenced state-sponsored operations increasingly rely on GenAI to produce and distribute misleading content to influence elections around the world.

Disruptive tactics and techniques make detection difficult. Criminal groups are increasingly using remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools to evade detection, driven by their operational efficiency. Tactics involving defence evasion showed the greatest increase, highlighting a trend toward strategies that do not involve writing code to disk.

Predictions for 2025

A major breach of AI spoofing in SaaS applications is expected, and new Chinese APT intrusions into U.S. critical infrastructure will be revealed. 

A high-impact cyber incident will likely involve macOS or mobile malware, and crypto fraud will result in a market-destabilising event.

Developers will adopt AI to transition to new code, and the U.S. will move towards harmonisation of cyber regulation.

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Drones and national security in the United States

The U.S. administration explained that it was considering a new rule that could restrict or ban Chinese drones in the United States because of national security concerns.

In an advisory, the Department of Commerce made explicit that the involvement of perceived foreign adversaries, most notably China and Russia, in the design, development, manufacture and supply of drones could pose an undue or unacceptable risk to U.S. national security.

China and Russia have shown their willingness to compromise U.S. infrastructure and security. through cyber spying, according to the Department of Commerce, which also warned that governments could take advantage of their laws and political situations to co-opt private entities for national interests.

Beyond the use of drones by drone hobbyists, the devices are also used in a variety of U.S. industries: helping farmers monitor crops and spray for pests, inspecting pipelines for the chemical industry, testing bridges and construction sites, and assisting firefighters and other emergency services.

But drones have evolved over the past decade to include cameras, receivers and sophisticated artificial intelligence abilities, feeling concerns that they could become a useful tool for an adversarial government.

China-based companies account for at least 75 percent of the U.S. drone market, a domain that offers ample opportunities for exploitation, according to the Department of Commerce. Russia accounts for a relatively small share of global drone sales but announced its intention to invest heavily in developing the domestic market.

The US Department of Commerce explained that drones could be used to damage physical infrastructure in a collision, deliver an explosive payload, or gather information about critical infrastructure, including building designs. Moreover, with critical infrastructure in the United States increasingly dependent on drones, any effort to remotely disable them would pose a risk to national security.

The Department added that in the past, China-based drone companies had pushed updates to their devices to create no-fly restrictions that disabled them in company-defined conflict zones.

The advisory said the Department of Commerce was also considering whether there were measures that could mitigate risks and allow the sale of Chinese drones to continue, such as with certain design or cybersecurity software requirements.

The proposed rule is part of a larger effort by the administration to examine and eliminate vulnerabilities in high-tech products and communications infrastructures that could involve the collection of large amounts of data on Americans.

In September, the administration decided to ban Chinese-developed software for Internet-connected cars in the United States. The initiative was intended to prevent Chinese intelligence agencies from monitoring the movements of Americans or using vehicle electronics as a way to learn about the U.S. power grid or other infrastructures.

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Cybercrime victimisation among adults and elderly people in England and Wales

Younger people are more likely to report cybercrime than older people. As older people spend more time online, this may begin to change. If similarly exposed, risk factors such as social isolation or poor health could make older adults disproportionately susceptible. The survey was conducted to explore whether cybercrime risks and their predictors vary across age groups.

The survey analysed the responses of 35,069 participants over the age of 16 in the 2019/20 Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW). They investigated, among people who have used the internet in the past year, the risks of suffering any cybercrime, repeated victimisation and associated financial losses among all age groups.

Despite having a lower risk of reporting any cybercrime in the past year, people over the age of 75 were more likely to report financial losses as a result of cybercrime victimisation and repeated cybercrime victimisation than younger people.

Men, those belonging to mixed or black ethnic groups, the most disadvantaged areas, managerial professional groups and with poorer health were at higher risk of cybercrime.

While younger adults are at a higher risk of cybercrime, older adults reported more severe cases – repetitive victimisation and associated financial losses – perhaps because of being less aware of scams and reporting options.

Because most people experience deteriorating health as they age, a greater understanding of why poor health predicts cybercrime could inform prevention initiatives that would particularly benefit older age groups and mitigate the risks of increasing internet use among older adults. Health and social care professionals could be well positioned to support prevention.

Cybercrimes include hacking through technological methods and social engineering, in which a victim is tricked into revealing the information needed to access a device, network or program, such as a banking application or to transfer money electronically.

Social engineering is a broad term that includes cryptocurrency-related fraud, phishing, and dating, and occurs on platforms such as email and social media. It is inherently discriminatory, as attackers tailor their approach to the vulnerabilities of different victims.

The survey finds that males are more likely to suffer victimisation and recidivism than females. A plausible explanation is that men, who have been found to take more risks than women in general, may also engage in higher-risk behaviours or activities online, making them more vulnerable to wrongdoers.

Older adults may also be less able than younger adults to avoid repeated victimisation and financial loss, and may also be underestimating less severe victimisation that does not involve recidivism in crime or financial loss.

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